Poverty dynamics among the Dalits of Tarai by Iversen, Thor Olav
  
 
Poverty dynamics among the Dalits of Tarai 
 
by 
 
Thor Olav Iversen 
 
Master thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
Master thesis to complete the degree 
 
Master in economics 
 
University of Bergen, Department of Economics 
September 2013 
 
 ii 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
First and foremost, I want to express special gratitude to my supervisor at the Chr. Michelsen 
Institute (CMI), Magnus Hatlebakk, for letting me participate in his research project on Nepal, 
and for always being available to answer my endless series of questions. I would not be able 
to travel to Nepal or write my master thesis on such a fascinating and rewarding topic if it 
were not for his project or diligent assistance. I also want to thank my supervisor at the 
University of Bergen, Gaute Torsvik, for invaluable guidance in the process of writing, and 
helping me overcome the challenges along the way.  
 
I furthermore want to thank Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) for accepting me as an affiliated 
master student and giving me the opportunity to be part of such an inspiring research 
environment. I am grateful for the economic support provided by CMI and the faculty of 
social sciences, University of Bergen, in relation to my fieldwork in Nepal. Thanks a lot to my 
fellow students at CMI. Furthermore I would also like to thank Ingrid Hoem Sjursen and Lars 
Gunnar Christensen for valuable comments. 
 
The University of Bergen also deserves to be thanked for having me enrolled for close to 
seven years, together with all my friends in Bergen. Especially thank you to the Department 
of Economics.  
 
In Nepal I want to show appreciation for my assistants Bishnu and Baral, the others 
employees at the National Labour Academy (NLA) and the interpreter Chandra which all 
helped my fieldwork and data collection to success. At last, thanks to the informants who 
participated in the survey in Baijanathpur. They provided me with the inspiration and 
knowledge to write this thesis.  
 
Thor Olav Iversen 
Thor Olav Iversen, Bergen 1. September 2013 
 
 iii 
 
Abstract 
 
Poverty dynamics among the Dalits of Tarai  
 
by 
 
Thor Olav Iversen, Masters in economics 
University of Bergen, 2013 
Supervisors: Gaute Torsvik (University of Bergen) and Magnus Hatlebakk (CMI) 
 
 
The literature suggests that links between social identity and economic outcomes can induce 
poverty among groups with low social status. This seems to be true in Nepal where Dalits, the 
group at the bottom of the caste system, is also the group with the highest poverty rates. The 
aim of this thesis is to investigate determinants of poverty dynamics in a distinct village in the 
Tarai region of Nepal, where around half the population belong to Dalit castes. 
 
The analysis uses quantitative data collected in a household survey done during a fieldwork to 
Nepal, conducted in cooperation with the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) of Bergen and the 
National Labour Academy (NLA) of Kathmandu. OLS as well as the logit model is used to 
investigate possible determinants of occupational outcomes and educational investment. All 
calculations are done by STATA version 11.2.  
 
A main finding of the thesis is that Dalit households are more probable to be stuck at low 
human capital levels over time: Illiteracy is more likely to persist over two household 
generations for Dalit than non-Dalit households. In the descriptive analysis, I furthermore find 
skilled wage labour in the modern sector of the economy to be a main pathway out of poverty 
for Dalits. Skilled workers are in turn found to be more likely to have education than lower-
income unskilled workers.  
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1 Introduction  
 
Poverty has a tendency to persist (Basu, 1997). The rural poor in developing countries are 
frequently perceived to be trapped in poverty because of lack of access to capital. This capital 
can take forms such as physical, human and social capital. Households that are poor in terms 
of capital might tend to end up as poorer not only in the present generation, but also in future 
generations, while the initial distribution of assets might empower other households to 
accumulate more wealth. The market power of different agents can affect to which extent they 
are able to reap the return of their capital stock and lack of different kinds of capital can also 
limit access to borrowed capital. This mechanism can reinforce structural inequality, where in 
addition to owning more assets, the well-off in terms of social or physical capital have access 
to a capital market where poor borrowers are denied.  
 
Social categories can be a powerful determinant as to who escapes poverty or not. This thesis 
will attempt to shed some light on the question of the interaction between social capital and 
poverty by focusing on the Dalit population of Nepal, and by extension Dalits in general in 
South-Asia. Like other forms of capital, social capital has a return and affects individual 
income. According to Das and Hatlebakk (2009) there is a strong correlation between social 
and economic exclusion in Nepal, and the traditional caste hierarchy is reproduced in 
economic inequalities. The specific interest in the Dalits arises from their status in Nepali 
society. The Dalits are at the bottom of the caste system, and caste can be seen as a form of 
social capital.  
 
Political and economic changes have affected the status of Dalits in recent years. Dalits have 
traditionally been excluded from a large part of the labour market, and had to take specific 
professions such as smiths, sanitation workers and tailors. Many of the Dalits of rural Tarai, 
the fieldwork-area in the plains of Nepal, have traditionally worked as wage labourers in 
feudal relations to land owners of other castes. However, due to changes in the political and 
general economic environment of Nepal, some of the Dalit have managed to take a step up the 
social and economic ladder by gaining employment as skilled wage labourers in the modern 
sector of the economy.  What separates these group members from the ones that still are 
employed in their traditional low-income professions? 
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I will use economic theory to discuss poverty traps and the accumulation of different kinds of 
capital over generations in interaction with several types of social discrimination. The thesis 
will also connect this theoretical discussion to actual circumstances. The data used for this 
thesis was collected during a fieldwork to the village of Baijanathpur in Nepal. Baijanathpur 
was chosen for the household survey because of its population structure: approximately half 
of the population belong to Dalit groups. The field work is further described in chapter 3 of 
this thesis. 
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2 Background 
 
In this section I provide insights into the background the cultural and economic context of 
Dalits, Nepal and the Tarai region. I aim to give an understanding of the Dalit social role in 
the context of the Hindu caste system, highlight the Nepali context and explain why doing 
research on Dalits in eastern Tarai promises to be an interesting case for poverty dynamics.  
2.1 Dalits and the caste system 
The Dalits of South Asia form a diverse, but distinctive cultural and social community. Dalits 
are frequently treated as deeply unequal in the daily life of Hindu society. They are excluded 
and avoided in a range of situations surrounding general social life, religion, food and drink. 
 
Dalits have through history had several other names like the ‘untouchables’, ‘scheduled 
castes’ or ‘Harijan’. ‘Dalit’ itself is a word that stems from the Marathi language of western 
India. It means ‘broken’ and was first used in caste context in the nineteenth century. The 
term is thus political and implies that the Dalit are oppressed by others. Frequent use dates 
from activist Indian Dalits in the 1970s. ‘Dalit’ is not used by all Dalits as a way to express 
their own identity, but is gaining ground among themselves and in media (Mendehlson and 
Vicziany, 1998, p. 4). 
 
According to Mendehlson and Vicziany (1998), the Dalit play a contradictory role in Hindu 
society. In the oldest Hindu literature, the Vedas, the Dalit have no place at all. Hindu society 
has traditionally been divided by the Vedas into four Varnas, or castes, associated with 
different professions; Brahmin (priest and teacher), Ksatriya (ruler and warrior), Vaishya 
(trader) and Sudra (servant). The Dalit probably formed as a distinguishable group around the 
second century AD, and are due to their absence from the Vedas frequently referred to as 
outcastes. Since the Varna has endured as a blueprint for the whole of Hindu society, the 
position of Dalits as Hindus is somewhat ambiguous. They are present as a group of low 
status below the Sudra caste, but do not have a clear place in the religious order.   
 
On another hand the Dalit play an important part in the Hindu belief, symbolized in the 
contrast between Brahmin and Dalit. This is the most consummate representation of the 
duality between the idea of purity and pollution which forms the basis of the whole hierarchy 
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in Hindu religion (Mendelsohn and Vicziany, 1998, p. 6). The Dalit are seen as permanently 
polluted, and being polluted by a Dalit through direct or indirect contact is particularly serious 
for other castes. This conception is said to arise because of the hereditary professions that 
Dalits have traditionally performed. Examples of such unclean work is skinning, tanning 
leather, removal of human waste, removal of corpses, prostitution or cleaning streets. Even 
though most of Dalits in present day South Asia do not work in these traditional and unclean 
professions according to common belief they are descended from people that were polluted by 
their work.  
 
Within each of the four Varnas there exist a large number of smaller and in-marrying ‘clans’, 
which serve as the commonly used concept of caste in everyday life. The existence of such 
groups is harmonized with religious literature by assuming that they represent a refinement of 
the caste-system. Despite falling outside the formal caste system, Dalits are also divided into 
such clans. The different Untouchable clans thus fit into an intra-Dalit hierarchy. Two fitting 
examples of Dalit-clans in Nepal would be the Musahar and Bantar groups of Baijanathapur, 
which serve as a focus of my thesis. Even though both groups are Dalit they are somewhat 
different in terms of historical heritage, ethnicity and even socioeconomic status. 
 
In general the Dalit groups of Nepal have a higher poverty level than other groups, both in the 
hill areas and in Tarai (Das and Hatlebakk, 2009, p. 32). The overall poverty headcount of 
Nepali Dalits is 42 percent compared to 23 percent for the rest of the population (NLSS, 
2012). The caste hierarchy is thus reproduced in economic terms. Dalits tend to work in 
agriculture or in a large variation of other unskilled occupations. Even though Dalits 
frequently work in agriculture, they less often own land than other groups. In rural South-
Asia, villagers who do not own land are generally worse off than those who do (Mendelsohn 
and Vicziany, 1998). Dalit groups also suffer from a poor educational situation: Only 8.3 
percent of the Dalit Musahar-caste was literate in 2003 (Das and Hatlebakk, 2009). 
 
The Varnas appear somewhat anachronistic as a division of contemporary Nepalese society. 
This is a result of Nepal’s complex ethnic mix that results from the vast array of different 
groups that are different in terms of linguistic, cultural and historical traits. In Nepal 
geographical as well as topographical divides are quite important when trying to determine a 
meaningful partition of the population along caste lines.  
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2.2 Nepal 
2.2.1 The Nepal Living Standard Survey 
The Nepal Living Standard Surveys (NLSS) of 1995/96, 2003/04 and 2010/11 provide us 
with a fairly detailed picture of the economic development of modern Nepal, and is the survey 
officially used for poverty estimation. The NLSS poverty estimation follows a Costs of Basic 
Needs (CBN) approach. The CBN poverty line can be defined as the amount of expenditure 
required by an individual to fulfil basic needs in terms of food and non-food items (NLSS, 
2012). In other words it moves as price increases, but is constant when adjusted for price 
level. The average poverty line for Nepal in 2010-11 has been estimated at 19261 Nepalese 
Rupee (NR).  The NLSS also frequently refers to the poverty gap. The poverty gap estimates 
how far below the poverty line the poor are on average as a proportion of the income needed 
for all people to be at that line.  
2.2.2 Economic development and poverty in Nepal 
Nepal is a small and landlocked South Asian country that borders India and China. It is 
among the poorest countries in the world and ranks 157 out of 187 countries on the Human 
Development Index. Nepal has a population of 30 million inhabitants and a gross domestic 
product per person of only 1300 US Dollars at purchasing power parity (CIA World 
Factbook, 2013). Despite abject poverty, Nepal has undergone significant progress over the 
recent years on several social indicators. The data collected in several rounds of NLSS paints 
a broad picture of a developing country in the process of economic modernization and 
diversification. The Nepali economy has been growing at a steady pace over the last three 
decades, poverty has decreased significantly and income inequality has improved.  
 
During the 8 years between 1995 and 2004 the Nepalese economy performed well, with GDP 
growing at almost 5 percent per year and an increase of 2.5 percent per capita per year. 
Growth accelerated in manufacturing, services and tourism (NLSS, 2004). In the years from 
2005 and 2011 the Nepalese economy continued to grow steadfast by an average of 4.2 
percent, while the growth in GDP per capita averaged 2.3 percent (World Bank, 2013a). 
 
The economic growth has coincided with a considerable decrease in both amount and severity 
of poverty in Nepal. From 1995 to 2004 poverty fell from 41.8 percent to 30.8 percent. The 
average poverty gap, and thus depth of poverty, also decreased significantly from 11.75 to 
7.55. From 2004 to 2011 poverty headcount declined further to 25.2 percent.  
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Poverty is divided unevenly among the different regions and topographical zones of Nepal. 
Poverty is most prevalent in rural areas: The poverty rate for urban areas is 15.5 percent and 
rural areas have a poverty rate of 27.4 percent. In Table 2.1 we see that the urban hill areas of 
Nepal are by far the least poor group at 9 percent versus 22 percent in the urban areas of 
Tarai. This geographical imbalance of poverty distribution mirrors the history of Nepal. The 
political and economic spheres of Nepal have traditionally been dominated by Nepali-
speaking groups that stem from the hill regions. The depth and severity of poverty is also the 
smallest for this region.  
 
In the rural hill areas the poverty headcount rate however range from 16 percent in Eastern 
Region versus 31 percent in Mid and Far Western Region of the Hills. With each region 
except the Eastern region, the rural hill areas have a higher poverty rate than the 
corresponding Tarai region (NLSS, 2012). This can in part be explained by Tarai’s 
concentration of industry, and good conditions for agriculture. There are also significant 
differences inside Tarai. Eastern Tarai, which traditionally has served as the region’s 
industrial hub, has the lowest poverty level of 21 percent. Meanwhile, the Mid and Far 
Western region of Tarai has a poverty rate of 31 percent. 
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Table 2.1 – Regional poverty in Nepal. NLSS 2012 
 
Region 
 
 
Headcount rate 
 
Poverty gap 
Mountains 42.3 10.1 
Hill 24.3 5.7 
Tarai 23.4 4.3 
   
Urban – Kathmandu 11.5 2.8 
Urban – Hill 8.7 1.7 
Urban – Tarai 
 
22.0 4.3 
Rural Hills – Eastern 15.9 2.9 
Rural Hills – Central 29.4 8.5 
Rural Hills – Western 28.0 5.3 
Rural Hills – Mid and far 
Western 
 
36.8 8.9 
Rural Tarai – Eastern 21.0 3.7 
Rural Tarai – Central 23.1 4.1 
Rural Tarai – Western 22.3 4.4 
Rural Tarai – Mid and Far 
Western 
31.1 7.2 
   
Nepal 25.2 5.4 
 
 
Over the period from NLSS (1996) to NLSS (2012), average Nepali household income in real 
terms grew by 96 percent, and mean per capita income increased even further by 117 percent. 
The economy’s income disparity narrowed during the same period: Per capita income for the 
poorest 20 percent of the population increased by 181 percent, while for the richest 20 percent 
it merely increased by 102 percent. Nonetheless, income is still unevenly distributed: The 
bottom 10 percent of the population earn 2 percent of total income while the top 10 percent of 
earners hold 40 percent of total income. The geographical distribution of income follows the 
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pattern observed for poverty disbursement. Non-surprisingly, the urban areas in the 
Kathmandu valley have the highest income per capita. Among rural areas, the rural eastern 
Tarai have the largest mean per capita income while the rural mid and far western hills 
regions have the lowest per capita income. 
 
Some would claim that consumption is a more accurate indicator of well-being than income. 
It measures an individual’s needs in terms of being able to meet basic needs. It is also 
measured with more reliability than income and is a better measure of household’s long-term 
welfare because it captures its ability to smooth out income volatility. Overall there has been a 
fast growth in per capita consumption in Nepal from 1995 to 2011. Consumption increased 
109 percent for the bottom quintile and 110 percent for the top quintile in real terms. In 
contrast to income distribution, the consumption disparity between the top and bottom 20 
percent of the population has thus widened slightly. The percentage of households stating a 
less than adequate consumption within the categories of food, education, health care and 
housing decreased during the period, while the percentage reporting a just adequate 
consumption level within the same categories increased.  
 
For many Nepalis, and even Dalits, gaining work in the non-agricultural sector has provided a 
pathway out of poverty. The richer the group in terms of consumption, the higher is their 
percentage participation in non-agricultural wage employment and operation of non-farm 
business (NLSS, 2012, p. 60). Households headed by agricultural wage workers are the most 
likely to be poor and households headed by formal-sector non-agricultural wage workers are 
the least likely to be poor. Households headed by professional wage workers have a poverty 
rate of 6 percent compared to 47 percent for households with a head in agriculture wage 
labour.  
 
The period from 1995 to 2011 bore witness to an increasing economic diversification away 
from the previous dominance of the agricultural sector. During the 15 years period, the share 
of agricultural income in the economy dropped from 61 percent to 28 percent. The proportion 
of households maintaining non-farm enterprises meanwhile increased from 24 to 35 percent. 
The large majority of these businesses are very small, as only 17 percent of non-farm 
enterprises employ hired labour. Despite this economic diversification and development, 
Nepal remains a nation of farmers: 74 percent of Nepali households own land that is used for 
agricultural purpose, and roughly 5 percent operate land owned by others, but do not own land 
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themselves. The large majority of farms are small in terms of land size and production. 
Landholdings are unevenly distributed. Small farmers own just 22 percent of the land while 
large land farmers own 18 percent, creating a Gini concentration index of 0.51.
 1
 
 
One of the most important traits of the Nepali economy is the prevalence of work migration. 
A considerable part of the population migrates to areas other than their native region for work. 
20 percent of Nepalis are absentees, defined as an existing member of a household that has 
had a long absence (NLSS, 2012). 57 percent of these absentees reside within Nepal and 43 
percent travel abroad. For many Nepali households, and for the economy as a whole, 
remittances make out a substantial part of income: 31 percent of total income in remittance-
receiving household stem from remittances. NLSS (2012) also indicates that remittances are a 
growing source of income for the Nepalese economy, both in absolute and relative terms. The 
frequency and size of remittances increased between NLSS (1996) and NLSS (2012). The 
percentage of households in Nepal receiving remittance swelled from 23 percent in 1995/96 to 
56 percent in 2010/11. The share of remittances from India decreased, while the share from 
other countries increased considerably. The largest share of remittances in terms of total value 
comes from external sources except India (69 percent), followed by remittances from within 
the country (20 percent), and India (11 percent). More rural than urban households receive 
remittances, but the per capita remittance flow is higher for urban areas. The value of per 
capita remittances is also much higher for the rich: Individuals in the poorest quintile on 
average receive one eighth of what individuals in the richest quintile do. 
2.3 Tarai and Baijanathpur 
2.3.1 The Tarai region 
The village used for data collection, Baijanathpur, is located in the south-eastern part of the 
Tarai region. Tarai is a mostly flat strip of land that covers Nepal’s border with India. Its area 
covers 15 percent of Nepal’s total land area, but comprises half of its population.  Tarai 
produces over half of Nepal’s GDP and has due to topography, infrastructure and connections 
to fast-developing India become an industrial hub. The closeness to India also affect the 
household income structure in a more direct sense: About two in three households in Tarai 
receive remittances as opposed to half of households in the hills and mountains regions 
(NLSS, 2012).  
                                                 
1
 The Gini concentration index equals one if all agricultural area is owned by one household and other 
households own no land. It is zero if all households own same sized areas. 
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Prior to the eradication of malaria few people from the hill areas of Nepal lived in Tarai 
(Gaige, 1975). Only after the eradication of malaria in the 1950s it became accessible for most 
outsiders to settle, even though the region was already inhabited by indigenous groups such as 
the Tharu. The Madhesis also have long roots in Tarai. They are the descendants of people 
who either emigrated from North India during the last two centuries or lived there even before 
the region was included in the Nepali state.  After the malaria eradication programs the Nepali 
state encouraged the migration of Nepali-speaking ‘Pahadi’ groups from the hills to Tarai. 
This served to ease a land shortage in the hills, but the indigenous groups of the region sold or 
lost large areas of land to the immigrant groups. The state’s goal was to create a population of 
people whose loyalty it had no doubt about as it harboured suspicions over the Madhes bonds 
to India.  
 
The population of Tarai can thus with broad strokes be divided into three groups; Indigenous 
groups with the largest group being Tharu; Madhesi, inhabitants that share kinship or roots 
with people across the border to India; and Pahadi, migrants from the hill-regions (Ollieuz, 
2012, p. 11). The duplicity of the land acquisition process and the simultaneous lack of 
support for the indigenous inhabitants created a resentment which has contributed to several 
Madhesi and Tharu rights movements and also spurred support for the (former) Maoist 
insurgency. In 2008 the ethnic and political grievances of the Tharu and Madhes erupted in a 
a series of lethally violent incidents commonly phrased as the ‘Madhesi Rebellion’. These 
incidents were related to the long-standing enmity caused in part by the previous land loss to 
hill-groups, as well as perceived exclusion from influence or positions in the Nepali state.  
 
The Madhesis share with Tharus and Dalits a marginal position in government and military 
service. Nepal’s citizenship laws also make it difficult for certain groups of Madhesis to attain 
citizenship, particularly for the rural and poor (Gaige, 1975). Most Nepali academics focus on 
the hill and mountain areas, which for them might represent the real Nepal (Ollieuz, 2012). 
The Tarai region has often been neglected in terms of both political attention and research. 
2.3.2 Baijanathpur and eastern Tarai 
Baijanathpur Village Development Comittee
2
 (VDC) is situated in the Morang district of 
eastern Tarai. The village borders Biratnagar - a major urban centre and industrial hub. 
                                                 
2
A VDC a local administrative unit in Nepal. Each VDC belongs to a district. 
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Eastern Tarai is considered the most economically vibrant area of Tarai and has a slightly 
lower poverty level than the central, eastern or western parts of Tarai. That is reflected by the 
fact that rural eastern Tarai is the rural area in Nepal with highest mean per capita income. As 
a whole it constitutes the most significant part of the region in terms of population, industries, 
and hosts a large concentration of Tarai’s urban population.  
 
The main rationale for doing a field work in Baijanthpur is the population structure of the 
VDC. Approximately half of Baijanathpur’s population are considered to be Dalit. These 
Dalits are mainly split in two groups; the Bantar and the Musahar. The traditional occupation 
of the Musahar is wage-labouring in agriculture and rickshaw pulling. Many Musahars have 
not been able to attain Nepali citizenship, and thus been rendered unable to register 
landholdings. The status of the Musahar also sets the rural eastern Tarai apart from other rural 
areas in Tarai. Despite the low rural poverty rate, eastern Tarai is the only region in Nepal 
with a large class of landless agricultural wage labourers, a part of the population where the 
Musahar suffer significant overrepresentation. Agricultural wage labourers typically endure 
low wages and a demand for their labour which is subject to variations in seasonal demand. 
Many of them are also trapped in feudal principal-agent relationships with landlords. The 
landlords have traditionally been able to set contracts that leave only small surpluses to the 
labourers and might also collude with other people to restrict their outside-options. They can 
also make their access to work contingent on a restriction on other contracts (Hatlebakk, 
2011). 
 
Non-agricultural wage labour has traditionally been a way out of poverty in Nepal, and even 
for the Musahar the non-agricultural wage rate is considerably higher than the agricultural 
wage. While the daily wage of a Musahar agricultural worker was 56 Nepali Rupees (NR) in 
2003, the average non-agricultural wage rate was 91 NR. Despite non-agricultural wages 
being considerably higher, Musahar still score considerably worse than other groups also in 
this category (Das and Hatlebakk, 2009, p. 28). In the latter years a significant part of the 
Musahar population has been able to gain employment in other sectors of the economy, 
despite their traditional social status.  
 
The Bantar clan are despite their Dalit status considered to be placed higher than the Musahar 
in the social hierarchy. Some Bantars are even reported to be owners of large areas of 
agricultural land in eastern Tarai or own large businesses. Still, their presence in the Nepali 
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public sector remains negligible and their overall educational situation is poor (Chaudhary, 
2011, p. 137). Similar to the Musahar, a large and seemingly increasing share of the Bantars 
in Baijanathpur find work in the modern and urbanized economy of Biratnagar. 
 
Examining these Dalit groups that traditionally worked in low-income occupations, but has 
made some headway out of the lower end of agricultural economy, promises to be an 
interesting case of poverty dynamics. As previously stated, caste can be seen as a form of 
social capital and despite the somewhat different position in the caste-hierarchy of the Bantar 
and Musahar, they share the common trait of being Dalit.  
2.4 Chapter summary 
Nepal is a developing country where Dalits stand at the bottom of a cultural and economic 
hierarchy that is enforced by the caste system. However, even though Nepal is poor it has 
experienced economic change and modernization over the last decades, which has brought 
new possibilities even for those at the bottom of society.  
 
With its large class of landless Dalits working in the agricultural sector, eastern Tarai 
promises to be an interesting case for studying who breaks out of the traditional low-wage and 
low-status occupations and climbs the first steps on the ladder out of poverty. Baijanathpur’s 
main attraction is its dense concentration of Dalits, but it is also proximate to a large urban 
labour market with a large demand for labour, which might provide the Dalits a pathway out 
feudal relations and offer possibilities of social and economic advancement. 
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3 Fieldwork 
 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the data collection-process, give an introduction to the 
questionnaire and describe the qualitative interviews.  
3.1 Survey 
I travelled to Kathmandu 8 February 2013. The survey in Baijanathpur started 14 February 
and lasted through 4 March. The time from my return to Kathmandu to 15 March was spent 
completing data-entry. The questionnaire in use is named ‘NLA-CMI survey on poverty 
dynamics in eastern Tarai’. The same questionnaire has been used in a more extensive project 
that collected a larger sample of households from several districts and VDCs in the eastern 
Tarai region. My survey added a distinct Dalit village to the larger study. 
 
The household survey was exclusively conducted in Baijanathpur VDC. The sample is 
randomized. Each VDC is divided into nine smaller administrative units called wards. Ward 
1, 3, 6, 7 and 9 were randomly selected as the areas where we would conduct the survey. 22 
households were interviewed in each of the 5 wards giving a total of 110 interviews. Local 
partners secured voter lists from the local VDC office that were used to randomly select the 
specific households within each ward. We did one interview in each household, but allowed 
more than one person to participate in the interview. The main respondent of the interview 
was preferably the household head, but frequently the spouse, son or other relatives.  
 
The household survey was conducted by two hired assistants from the National Labour 
Academy (NLA) in Kathmandu. They were experienced field workers, and already 
familiarized with the relevant questionnaire due to their participation in the previous project. 
The interviews were conducted in the languages of Nepali or Maithili, and I participated by 
observing the interviews. Thus I was able to correct observed mistakes and ask elaborating 
questions. I did data-entry and coding continuously during the field-work, and the survey 
questionnaires were stored at NLA’s premises in Kathmandu after data-entry was completed. 
  
3.1.1 Questionnaire content 
Studies in economics often use data from large samples, but that only cover a short span of 
time. In contrast to such an approach the questionnaire in use records household-data over 
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three generations. This approach is inspired by the field of economic anthropology. A long 
time-horizon could help understand the underlying reasons of why some households stay poor 
over generations, and others climb out of poverty (Hatlebakk, 2012a). 
 
The questionnaire lists the occupation, education, income and age of the members of every 
household, as well as all brothers and sons of the household head. Income of each family 
member is reported either as daily wage or monthly salary, as well as occupational 
descriptions. The questionnaire records size, source and interest rate of household borrowing 
in the credit market. It asks a range of questions about among other things housing standards, 
housing upgrades, explanation for lack of schooling, work migration, renting of land and 
production shocks. It also asks for the household to state reasons for declining or increasing 
land ownership over generations, as well as for generations of landlessness. 
 
The questionnaire collects self-reported family history of the household head. We used one 
page of the questionnaire to describe the family history and listed the names of the 
grandfather, father and household head. The oldest male individual in the household over 30 
years was identified as the household head, regardless of whether he was the household 
member interviewed or not. If the actual household head was female we listed her husband as 
household head for family history. In other words, deceased individuals could also be defined 
as household heads. If the actual household head was a male under 30 years old we defined 
his father as the household head.  
 
We also listed the father and grandfather of the household head’s education, land ownership at 
40 years of age, as well as occupation and events of migration.  
3.2 Qualitative interviews 
In addition to the household survey, I performed six semi-structured qualitative interviews 
during the fieldwork, with the assistance of a local interpreter. These are intended to provide 
anecdotal evidence to supplement the quantitative analysis. They also allow me to elaborate 
on interesting trends in the data.  The questions broadly followed the outline of the survey, 
chronicling the respondents’ family history in terms of occupation and land ownership.  
In order to avoid any disturbance to the survey, the qualitative interviews were carried out in 
wards where we already had finished the survey-interviews or wards where we did not 
conduct the survey at all. One of the interviews was done in Ward 3 after we finished the 
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survey, while three interviews were done in two villages in Ward 5 and two interviews were 
done in separate villages in Ward 8. We also interviewed the local VDC officers to provide 
additional information on the history, economic conditions and caste distribution of 
Baijanathpur. 
3.3 Chapter summary 
The field work consisted of both qualitative interviews and a quantitative survey. The 
quantitative survey is the main material for the analysis sections, and the qualitative 
interviews are intended to supplement the quantitative discussion. Data treatment and data 
entry was done by me continuously in the field. Possible issues of the data collection are 
handled in subchapter 5.5. 
 
The data collected by the household survey allows me to test the extended model for the 
effect of household endowments on occupational outcomes, while controlling for the effect of 
caste. In chapter 5 and 6, I will explore the data collected in the survey, before proceeding to 
describe econometric methodology in chapter 7 and performing the quantitative analysis in 
chapter 8.  
 
In the coming chapter I will discuss the theoretical literature of poverty traps, and develop an 
extended version of a theoretical model presented by Ghatak and Jiang (2002). I aim to 
discuss poverty dynamics among the Dalits by testing if the theoretical model is relevant to 
the Dalits in Baijanathpur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Theoretical framework and hypothesis 
 
In this section I aim to provide a theoretical backdrop for analyzing poverty dynamics among 
Dalits in Nepal. I first do a review of literature on poverty traps in general, and then move on 
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to the interplay between social identity and poverty traps. After the literature review I extend 
a model by Ghatak and Jiang (2002) to include social capital. I afterwards compare the model 
to anecdotal evidence from the qualitative interviews fieldwork, and draw two hypothesises 
from the model which will be tested in the quantitative analysis of chapter 8.  
4.1 Poverty trap literature 
Your income today influences your income in the future. The most important idea underlining 
the term chronic poverty is that an observed household’s income consistently falls below the 
poverty line. The frequent persistence of poverty raises the suspicion that it exists in a state of 
equilibrium (a poverty trap) that gets restored after every disturbance. Poor people hence tend 
to remain poor because they start out poor. If poverty traps exist, a single infusion of aid could 
for instance make a large difference to an individual or country by setting it on a new path 
that in the long term will lead to a non-poor outcome. Some economists oppose the idea of 
poverty traps (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). A frequently used argument is that since many 
countries that were once poor are now rich, poverty traps is an inherently flawed concept. The 
same argument also applies at the individual or household level.  
 
In research literature there exist a variety of mechanisms that create supposed poverty traps. 
These mechanisms can operate at individual level as a result of preferences or abilities, in 
households or even the economy-wide level. I will present theories that operate at all these 
levels. In the next section I will discuss both single and multiple equilibrium poverty traps as 
well as empirical testing of poverty traps. 
4.1.1 Single and multiple equilibrium poverty traps  
Some of the models in the literature on poverty traps operate with multiple equilibrium 
mechanisms where both poor and non-poor outcomes exist.  Individuals stuck in a multiple 
equilibrium poverty trap thus suffer avoidable poverty. In such models ownership of physical 
capital is frequently the determinant of whether or not an individual is stuck in a poverty trap. 
There often exists a critical asset value where if an individual being over or under will decide 
whether he or she is trapped in poverty or not. An actual economic misfortune might therefore 
have permanent consequences by pushing the poor under the threshold wealth level required 
to stay out of a poverty trap and hence trap them at a low income level. A low-cost program 
that pushes individuals just over the critical asset value would therefore spur additional saving 
and investment that lift individuals from a poverty-trap trajectory or equilibrium to a long-
term high income trajectory. The possible existence of multiple steady states for individuals 
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or groups thus provides an argument for attempts of poverty-reducing interventions in the 
economy that could generate large and lasting gains (Barrett and Carter, 2013). 
 
The S-shaped income curve is an example of such a multiple-equilibrium poverty trap 
mechanism. The S-shape of the curve is the source of the poverty trap (Banerjee and Duflo, 
2011). On the diagonal line, income in the future equals income today. For the individuals 
that are left of the threshold wealth level T, income tomorrow will be less than income today 
and they over time will get poorer and poorer and converge towards equilibrium P. For those 
right of wealth threshold level T income will increase from one day to the next until they are 
in high-income equilibrium H. Pushing an individual over wealth level T would thus lift an 
individual out of poverty and towards a long-term path of prosperity. Without the poverty 
trap, individuals would simply converge towards the high income equilibrium H.  In chapter 
8, I will return to figure 4.1 and 4.2 in order to discuss whether I find any indication of a 
poverty trap in my data. 
 
Figure 4.1.: Multiple-equilibrium poverty trap 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2.: No poverty 
trap 
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Other poverty trap mechanisms in the literature operate in a single-equilibrium environments 
where there does not exist a non-poor outcome. This kind of poverty trap may exist at an 
economy-wide level and could be understood as an outcome of technologies like institutional 
quality or methods of production. There might also exist single stable states for certain groups 
and individuals. These individuals or groups could possess traits that sort some into a high 
level steady state, but others into a low-level steady state. A single-equilibrium poverty trap 
creates a rationale for more long-term investment to change underlying factors for individuals 
or the economy, for instance improving on institutions or reducing malnutrition.  Single and 
multiple equilibriums can coexist within one economy, with some households facing a single 
poor or non-poor equilibrium, while other face several different outcomes.  
 
There are many issues to take into account while testing for poverty traps. Even when 
multiple equilibriums exist, they can be challenging to find empirically. Within one economy 
some individuals might for instance be subject to multiple equilibriums while other might not. 
It could thus be very difficult to separate empirically between situations of one multiple 
equilibrium or several single equilibriums.  
 
Changes in the study-environment can also change underlying parameters and the 
equilibrium, for instance by varying the critical asset value for each study. The use of assets 
as a determinant could pose further challenges. The use of money measures is complicated by 
monetizing different asset types. Empirical tests can prove vulnerable to distortion because of 
arbitrariness when gathering very different units into one measure. Other kinds of assets like 
social and natural capital might also remain unobserved.  
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Some researchers have recently begun to favour a more indirect approach to testing poverty 
traps, for instance by using behavioural data. These test behavioural implications of poverty 
trap models. Behavioural patterns that could emerge as a result of a rational response of 
someone being in a poverty-trap would in such cases serve as an indication of a trap. This 
approach also allows researchers to experiment with interventions and then examine 
behavioural change. Some examples of such interventions are randomized handouts of cash 
transfers, credit or fertilizer (Barrett and Carter, 2013, p. 25). 
4.1.2 Poverty-trap sources 
The literature refers to a multitude of poverty-trap sources. Does being poor for instance make 
it hard to plan for the future? Some theories model poor individuals’ psychological reaction to 
poverty by shortening time spans.  
 
There is empirical evidence that the saving rate is very low at low income levels and increases 
once the income rises over certain poverty thresholds. According to Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel 
and Servén (2000), a doubling of private income in developing countries increases the savings 
rate by one tenth. Barriers to saving might not only be externally imposed. The poor in their 
daily lives already have to exert much self-control because of their material situation. This 
may make it harder to muster the discipline needed to save. This is further supported by the 
fact that the poor due to constant high risk levels live with a considerable stress, as well as a 
bad nutritional situation which might make it hard to consider the long term. A sense of 
having few opportunities can make behaviour reflect the desperation of very low material 
living standards, and a sense of stability might therefore be necessary for people to take the 
long view. According to economic theory, when income level declines towards a minimum it 
might also become impossible for the poor to accept a lower income level. That means that 
the marginal utility of consumption goes towards infinity which in turn makes the poor 
unwilling to save (Hatlebakk, 2012b). 
 
 
For these reasons we could expect the rich to save more, and the poor do save relatively little.  
As people get richer they will save and invest a higher fraction as it becomes easier to divert 
resources for future use. This means that the rich will have more resources in the future than 
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the poor. The poor hence stay poor because they do not save enough (Banerjee and Duflo, 
2011).  
 
The daily lives of the poor are surrounded by large risks. Adverse health events or crop failure 
are some examples of risks to which the poor are often cited as being disproportionally 
vulnerable. There may be poverty-inducing effects that are outcomes of such high-risk 
environments. Risk makes us worry and worrying makes us stressed and/or depressed. Being 
stressed or depressed in turn makes it harder to focus and makes us less productive. An actual 
adverse outcome may also hurt the poor more severely than the well-off. It is harder to muster 
the capital needed to pay healthcare fees or to cut consumption if one is already poor. 
According to multiple equilibrium poverty trap theory, an adverse shock might also push an 
individual or an economy below the asset threshold level required to stay out of a poor steady 
state and thus trap them in poverty. 
 
Having a high marginal utility of consumption will in addition to decreased willingness to 
save, lead to risk adversity. The poor do in fact tend to react to their increased vulnerability 
and higher risk level by behaving more risk adverse in the way they manage businesses and 
farms. They may for example know of new types of crops, but choose not to adopt them since 
there is a small chance of them failing. Such a mechanic may enforce poverty. That poor 
individuals behaviour related to risk might affect economics outcomes is well documented. 
Poor farmers’ profit rates can go up as much as 35 percent if they adopt a new technology. In 
the case of rich farmers there is no such relationship, presumably because they can afford to 
lose a harvest and therefore are more willing to take risks and actually adopt new technologies 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). 
 
A large fraction of the poor run small scale businesses, often just for subsistence. By far most 
of the businesses never grow to the degree where they can hire employees. Rate of returns on 
investments in businesses in developing countries have been found to be very high at low 
levels of investment, but to sink fast with additional investment (McKenzie, 2006). Poor 
entrepreneurs might therefore not invest much in growing their business. The frequently hard 
competition from other very similar businesses is one possible explanation of low rates of 
return on additional investment. Hence the businesses of the poor might be stuck with at very 
small sizes and leave their operators unable to escape from a poverty. 
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Liquidity traps might also be a source of continuous poverty. Businesses or households could 
face high borrowing costs or be unable to borrow enough to make poverty-alleviating 
investments. The poor rarely have access to large loans from banks and credit from informal 
sources tends to be expensive. Yearly interest rates for the poor in developing countries are 
often in the 40 to 200 percent range, and frequently higher than for the rich. According to 
some theories they might also face a greater demand for collateral because threats of 
punishment are less effective against poor. Running a small business is as mentioned common 
for the poor in developing countries, but because of these credit restrictions it might be more 
difficult for them to develop their entrepreneurial activity. Higher interest rates and demands 
for collateral might hinder individuals from adopting new technologies and performing 
profitable profession-changes. It might also stop them from making profitable investments in 
their businesses and expanding production.  
 
There is a general agreement in economic literature that human capital is a determinant of 
economic outcomes and education is one of the most used measures of human capital. 
According to a model presented by Barham, Boadway, Marchand and Pestieau (1995), lack of 
education can cause poverty traps. Education in the model increases income, but poor 
households can be unable to finance education due to liquidity constraints. Thus the children 
of poor households can become stuck at low levels of income and education, while children of 
wealthier households get more education and in turn get higher income.  
 
Another frequently cited source of human capital is health. Poor health could have the 
potential of creating poverty traps. Workers with poor health might miss workdays, sick 
children learn less in school or sick mothers give birth to sickly children. Bad health is thus a 
possible transmission-channel from current misery to future poverty. One positive aspect of a 
health related poverty trap is that one might only need a push to escape it. For example if one 
generation gets to grow up and work in a healthy environment, starting a circle of good health 
and higher income which then is transmitted to the next generations. Poor individuals in 
developing countries are less healthy than richer ones because they frequently cannot afford to 
buy health care. They are also less likely to buy prevention before a disease happens and not 
be able to afford proper treatment after the infection has taken place. In addition the poor as 
already stated are more likely to be malnourished, increasing their vulnerability to infectious 
disease (Currais, Lòpez and Rivera, 2005).  
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The inability of the poor to feed themselves properly has also been stated as a source of 
poverty traps. General effects from malnutrition vary widely. There is not only discomfort in 
being malnourished; there might also be impairment from engaging in physical and mental 
activities. Malnutrition also causes fatigue and might hinder the ability to work, hence 
decreasing an individual’s productivity (Dasgupta and Ray, 1986). Not surprisingly an 
overwhelming majority of the malnourished live in low-income countries. The poor cannot 
afford to eat enough or right which makes them less productive. Hence hunger and 
malnutrition keeps them poor. As people get richer they can buy more food. Once their basic 
needs are taken care of, more food builds strength allowing people to produce more then they 
need to stay alive. This mechanic might breed both economic inequality and poverty traps. 
The poor get poorer and the rich get richer and eat better, and get stronger and then even 
richer, and the gap increases further.  
 
Some even see a large proportion of the world’s poorest people and even entire countries as 
stuck in health-induced poverty-traps (Bahadur, Faye, Kruk, McArthur, McCord, Sachs and 
Schmidt-Traub, 2004).   One example that has been used is that countries where more than 50 
percent of the population are exposed to malaria have per-capita incomes that are one-third of 
those in countries that get no malaria. According to poverty-trap theory being so much poorer 
makes it harder for them to take efficient steps toward curbing the malaria epidemic, and 
malaria in turn keeps them poor. The literature would then suggest that an investment in 
efforts that would curb the malaria epidemic would be highly efficient. Access to clean water 
and sanitation are also examples of other kinds of potentially poverty trap-breaking health-
investments (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). 
 
One might imagine poverty traps caused by low levels of human capital (i.e. poor health or 
education), as multi-equilibrium poverty traps similar to the one envisaged by figure 4.1. In 
these situations, a one-time investment in health or education could be thought to lift the 
individual or group over a critical value of human capital, and spur a cycle of growing 
income. A poverty trap caused by a poor nutritional situation could however also be imagined 
as a single-equilibrium poverty trap, as sustained effort or change in underlying economic 
circumstances might be necessary to lastingly improve on the nutritional situation of 
households or groups. 
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Some academics however believe that until political institutions are fixed, countries cannot 
really develop. One view is that countries with better institutions, more secure property right 
and better policies will invest more in physical and human capital and use these assets more 
efficiently to achieve a higher level of income. According to Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2000) institutions can be very long-lived. They introduce the term of “extractive 
institutions” that were set up by European nations in areas where Europeans found it difficult 
to settle during the colonial-era. At the other extreme we have more easily inhabitable 
colonies where Europeans settled and brought with them European institutions. The main 
purpose of the extractive states was to extract as much resources as possible with the smallest 
amount of investment required. The paper argues that there is a strong correlation between the 
quality of these early institutions and the quality of institutions today that in turn has a strong 
effect on national economic outcomes (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2000).  Bad 
policies or politics that are outcomes of bad institutions might thus play a part in inducing 
regional or nation-wide poverty traps.  
 
An example is corruption, which in many developing countries cause massive inefficiencies. 
Some even see it as a nation-wide poverty trap: Poverty breeds corruption and corruption 
causes poverty. Aid should therefore be earmarked specific goals that can be monitored with a 
reasonable effort. Breaking the poverty trap and raising living standard in itself will make the 
civil society and governments better able to maintain the rule of law and curb corruption.  
 
Lack of family planning might also be a source of poverty traps: Children born in large 
families might be less likely to be properly nourished, get education or good health care. In 
economic terms they get less investment in their human capital. According to surveys 
conducted in Nepal, poverty increases with household size and number of young children 
(NLSS, 2012). The possible existence of such a poverty trap however raises a question of 
causality. The main issue is to which direction the causality points: It is not clear whether 
being poor cause families to get more children, or if having more children makes a family 
poor. If having more children makes a family poor, lack of family planning can create an 
intergenerational poverty-trap mechanism in which parents get many poor children. The 
possible existence of such a poverty trap creates a rationale for active population policy 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). 
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4.2 Social identity and poverty traps 
Most economic analysis tends to focus on monetary utility or motivation such as consumption 
or income. Economists often assume that preferences are individual characteristics 
independent of their social and cultural surroundings (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010). In the real 
world, however, individuals’ conceptions depend on the context. Social categories might be 
an abstract concept, but they are therefore a powerful factor in determining economic 
outcomes. For instance, we observe that the cultural context is an important factor in deciding 
who in Nepal escapes poverty or not: The percentage of poor among the Dalits is close to 
double the percentage for non-Dalits (NLSS, 2012).    
 
Economists often think of production as depending on resources like physical and human 
capital as well as management. Relationships do not imply any market advantage and are not 
given any value. However, excluding social capital might be problematic. Two predominant 
views on social capital in economics can be clearly distinguished. The first sees social capital 
as a stock of trust and personal attachment for a group or society that facilitate provision of 
public goods. A second version sees social capital as an asset that exists to the benefit of a 
single individual or firm, sometimes meaning access to networks of interconnected agents 
where the individuals derive benefit from those with whom they form the network.  
 
Relationships and trust might enable individuals and societies to lower transaction costs. For 
instance, trust-based market features, such as easy access to credit, are present in most 
developed countries, but frequently lack in developing countries. Thus lack of social capital 
might exert a permanent negative influence on economic development in countries with a low 
stock of trust.  Social capital in both a society and at the individual level can thus make 
contract enforcement more efficient and relationships can facilitate information exchanges 
that lower search costs (Fafchamps and Minten, 2002). However, individual social capital 
could be a source of market imperfections as well as personal enrichment if social ties 
facilitate collusion and nepotism. It is thus unclear whether social capital is a cause of market 
imperfections or a cure.  
 
Which individuals in an economy get stuck in poverty traps and who escape could also be 
affected by social discrimination. An employer may for instance refuse to hire members of a 
discriminated group, the group might be unable to gain access to the credit market and thus be 
forced to forego productive investments, or consumers in the product market might be 
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unwilling to buy products made by members of the group. By using the term of discrimination 
coefficient it is possible to provide a definition of a taste of discrimination that applies in 
different markets and scenarios. The monetary cost of an action does not always equal all 
costs, and such a coefficient can be used to include the preference for discrimination.  
 
An employer might for instance act as if the wage equals        when considering whether 
to employ a member of the discriminated group.   is the monetary wage.   is the 
discrimination coefficient and translates the preference for discrimination into monetary 
terms. If    , it is a case of negative discrimination among employers. The discrimination 
coefficient thus represents a non-monetary cost of production. If productivity was equal and 
other non-discriminated groups simply received a wage of   then a utility maximizing 
employer would never use labour from the discriminated group unless they accept lower 
wages. If    , this would be a case of positive discrimination where the group subject to the 
discrimination coefficient would become a preferred group to hire. A discriminating 
consumer might act as if the price of a product produced by the discriminated group would be 
       whereas the normal price of the good was  . Discriminating customers would if 
    not buy the good produced the discriminated group, provided that there are 
homogenous products made with labour from groups which are not discriminated against. 
Such discrimination would add an implicit cost for employers when considering whether to 
hire discriminated labour (Becker, 1971).  
 
Akerlof (1976) outlines a scenario of caste-discrimination in the labour and product market. 
This product market discrimination is transmitted into the labour market via a caste code that 
distributes the high-productivity jobs to high castes, low-productivity jobs to low-castes and 
scavenging jobs to the Dalit. The threat of sanctions for buying goods from firms that break 
the caste code might deter potential customers from buying from them, rendering it 
unprofitable to hire cheaper labour and lower castes in the high-productivity jobs.  In the right 
circumstances (small potential break-out coalition or where costs of cooperation are high) this 
might create an equilibrium that follows the caste code. The equilibrium could thus be 
discriminating due to features of the caste system that transmit into the economy through 
product and labour market discrimination. A mechanism that creates a steady state of 
discrimination in one or more markets might hence trap certain groups in poverty as they are 
locked in low-income professions. The caste-code equilibrium is a Nash-equilibrium, but not 
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Pareto-optimal. Optimally all castes would choose their profession freely, and thus the labour 
force will separate themselves optimally between different types of jobs. 
4.2.1 Poverty traps in my thesis 
Does social identity play a role in occupation and asset distribution? In the following 
subchapter I present a new version of a borrowing-constraint model that was originally 
presented by Ghatak and Jiang (2002). I will use an extended version of this particular 
economic model to shed light on how the existence social capital can distort economic 
outcomes. The patterns of social status are in the model brought into the economy by 
affecting market structures and can in the right circumstances create multi-generational 
poverty traps. 
4.3 A multi-generational model of social capital and mobility 
We know that Dalits constitute the poorest social group in Nepal, and I will investigate why 
this may be the case. Through what channels does the low social status of the Dalit turn into 
adverse economic outcomes?   
 
I extend a model outlined by Ghatak and Jiang (2002). The Ghatak and Jiang (2002) model is 
in turn a short version of Banerjee and Newman (1993), which allows for more specific 
predictions than the original model. The model allows me to discuss how poverty traps can 
appear in a setting of castes and social capital. In my extended version I add caste as an 
economic factor. Then the income and asset ownership of a household depends on caste, in 
addition to how much wealth the parents inherited from the previous generation. In other 
words what income your parents make, as well as their caste, will be an important factor in 
deciding which occupation you end up in.  
 
The original model analyzes a dynamic model of occupational choice in the presence of credit 
market imperfections. Whether you gain access to the capital market or not depends on your 
inherited wealth, which again depends on what income your household’s previous generations 
made in their profession. Hence households can become stuck in a liquidity trap where they 
are unable to finance any investments. 
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4.3.1 The basic model  
Consider an economy populated by forever-living households. Each agent of each household 
lives one period. The population size is normalized to one and there is no population growth.  
In period   a household   is endowed with one unit of labour and wealth     . The agent of that 
period earns income by supplying labour and/or capital and the resulting income      is 
divided between consumption      and bequest to the next generation            .  
 
Each agent’s budget constraint is thus 
 
                (4.1)  
 
We assume a Cobb-Douglas utility function where utility depends on consumption and what 
is left for the next generation as bequest. 
 
                   
       
 
 (4.2)  
    
In optimum the current generation will save   of its income and passes it on to the next 
generation. 
 
              
 
(4.3)  
 
In period  , the economy`s wealth is distributed according to the probability measure       . 
And below we will need the distribution function for wealth up to a, but not including a, 
                . This is the share of the population with wealth (assets) below the 
capital     needed to invest in modern technology. 
4.3.2 Production technologies 
There are two production technologies. The subsistence agriculture technology uses one unit 
of labour to produce   units of output. The entrepreneurial technology uses     units of 
capital and two units of labour to produce   units of output at price 1. The entrepreneur 
spends his unit of labour monitoring the worker, who in turn is spending a unit of labour to 
produce the output. The net income with the entrepreneurial technology is greater than what 
two units of labour can produce using the subsistence technology. 
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         (4.4)  
 
Where r (   ) is an exogenous rate of return on saved capital. 
4.3.3 Occupations 
In Nepal switching from the agricultural sector to wage labour in the modern sector has been 
a pathway out of poverty, as non-agricultural wages on average are close to double as high 
(Das and Hatlebakk, 2009). Similarly, in the Ghatak and Jiang (2002) model agents can be 
employed in three different occupations, ranging from self-employed subsistence through 
being a worker to entrepreneurship. 
 
a) Subsistence: The agent earns income by using his labour supply to produce   using the 
subsistence technology. In this model it is possible to put assets in the bank which yields      . 
But one may also imagine that the person lend money in the informal credit market. Total 
income is: 
 
     
          (4.5)  
 
 
b) Worker: The agent works for an entrepreneur for a wage    that will be determined in the 
model. He can also earn interest income on his assets, so that total income becomes: 
 
     
           (4.6)  
 
c) Entrepreneur: An agent is unable to borrow in the credit market. He therefore needs   to start a 
firm. He hires one worker to produce output  , and spends his own time monitoring the 
worker. Excess capital will earn interest rate, so the total income becomes: 
 
     
                 (4.7)  
 
4.3.4 Social capital and castes 
What kinds of capital do people need to start a successful business? Evidence indicates that in 
addition to financial capital, social capital is an important input. According to a study by 
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Kolstad and Wiig (2013), certain forms of social networks are highly correlated with business 
success. They found a significant positive correlation between knowing a policeman and the 
business profits of entrepreneurs in Angola. Fafchamps and Minten (2002) document a strong 
positive effect of social capital via non-family social networks on the productivity of 
Madagascan grain traders. Traders with high stocks of social capital get an advantage via 
lower costs of information collection, credit provision and quality inspections. Social capital 
thus seems to economize on transaction costs. It could also influence economic outcomes 
indirectly, through influencing accumulation of other forms of capital such as human capital.  
 
Caste can be looked upon as a form of social capital both in the sense that caste discrimination 
can cut individuals off from such valuable networks, and because individuals of low caste 
could be liable to suffer different forms of market-discrimination. In the following sections I 
present an extended model where Dalit households due to low social capital suffer 
discrimination in the product market and decreased entrepreneurial income.  
4.3.5 Social capital and entrepreneurship 
I introduce two different castes in the previous model, one high caste and one low caste. Low 
castes will be referred to as Dalits and high castes as high castes. Due to low levels of social 
capital, Dalit entrepreneurs suffer discrimination in the product market: 
 
         (4.8)  
 
   is the entrepreneur production of high castes and    is the entrepreneur production for 
Dalits, with    . As prices are set to 1, production equals income. Dalits thus earn less as 
entrepreneurs.  
 
Households need assets        to become entrepreneurs. I define   
     as the capital 
constrained Dalit fraction of the total population and   
     as the capital constrained high 
castes fraction of the total population. Both   
     and   
     are thus fractions of total 
population and can be summarized,   
       
    , to get all capital constrained individuals 
as fraction of the entire population. I will refer to individuals with        as non-constrained 
individuals. Below we also need the Dalit fraction of the population,   , and the high caste 
fraction of the population,   . 
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4.4 Labour market 
For there to exist a labour market, both entrepreneurship and being a worker needs to be a 
viable option for one or more individuals in the economy. In order to find stable equilibriums 
in the labour market, it is useful to find the wages where households are indifferent between 
being workers or entrepreneurs.  
4.4.1 Wage rate of indifference 
The wage rate of indifference between being worker and entrepreneur is dependent on the 
income of entrepreneurs. I therefore have to find a wage rate of indifference for both Dalits 
and high-castes. Even though I end up with separate wage rates of indifference, there can still 
only be one equilibrium wage for workers and this wage may equal one of the wage rates of 
indifference.  
 
The wage rates of indifference are found by solving an equation where worker’ and 
entrepreneur’ income is equalized, but where the entrepreneur earns either    or   . 
 
 
 
                       
(4.9)  
 
 
 
                       
(4.10)  
 
I find the wage rate of indifference for Dalits and high castes by solving each of the equations 
for  :  
 
 
   
     
 
 (4.11)  
 
 
   
     
 
 
 
(4.12)  
 
Dalits earn less as entrepreneurs and will thus accept lower wages as workers. I see that if 
        all non-constrained high castes will become entrepreneurs, while all Dalits 
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will choose being workers. If        all non-constrained Dalits and high castes will 
become entrepreneurs and only constrained individuals become workers. 
4.4.2 Labour supply and demand 
In Ghatak and Jiang (2002) the labour market has two equilibriums, one with the subsistence 
wage as the equilibrium and one with the wage rate of indifference as described above as the 
equilibrium. Unlike the original model, the extended version has two separate wage rates of 
indifference. In order to describe the labour market I need to find the wage intervals that 
contain both a labour supply and demand. 
 
For      the labour supply is zero. Thus   acts as a lower wage bound in the labour 
market. If the wage is  , the labour supply is      
       
      as capital constrained 
individuals become indifferent between being workers and employed in the subsistence 
sector. If the wage is in the interval       , then all would like to be entrepreneurs, but 
some are capital constrained and thus have to supply labour, so the total supply is   
     
  
    . If the wage is    the labour supply is    
           
     as Dalits become 
indifferent between working as entrepreneurs or workers. If the wage is in the interval 
       , where only high castes want to be entrepreneurs, all Dalits want to be workers 
and labour supply become      
    . If      labour supply is       
        , as high 
castes become indifferent between working as entrepreneurs or workers. If      , the 
labour supply equals one as all individuals supply labour.    therefore acts as an upper wage 
bound in the labour market. Now I am ready to write down and draw the labour supply 
schedule. 
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Labour supply: 
 
      (4.13)  
 
         
       
       (4.14)  
 
         
       
     (4.15)  
 
        
           
     (4.16)  
 
             
     (4.17)  
 
           
         (4.18)  
 
       (4.19)  
 
Figure 4.3: Supply schedule  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
   
1      
       
       
     0 
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The labour demand mirrors the supply decisions as entrepreneurs demand labour. If    , 
the labour demand is zero as all individuals prefer being workers. If the wage is   , labour 
demand becomes         
      as non-constrained high castes become indifferent between 
being entrepreneur and worker. If the wage is in interval        , only non-constrained 
high castes,      
    , demand labour. For wage    labour demand equals       
  
            
      because Dalits are indifferent between being entrepreneurs and 
workers. For any wage in the interval     , the labour demand is at a maximum of 
      
            
     , as all non-constrained individuals become entrepreneurs and 
demand labour. I can now write and draw the full labour demand schedule. 
 
Labour demand: 
 
       (4.20)  
 
             
      (4.21)  
 
             
     (4.22)  
 
             
            
      (4.23)  
 
           
            
      (4.24)  
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Figure 4.4: Demand schedule  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entrepreneurship and being employed as a worker is an option for parts of the population in 
two connected wage intervals. In the interval       , entrepreneurship is possible for both 
non-constrained high castes and Dalits, and the wage is high enough to create a labour supply. 
In the interval        , entrepreneurship remains an option for non-constrained high castes, 
while all Dalits want to be workers once the wage rises over   .  
4.4.3 Labour market equilibrium 
From the labour demand and supply schedules of the previous section I can find and draw the 
equilibrium wage rates of the extended model. Each entrepreneur can only hire one worker. If 
more individuals supply (demand) labour, the wage is pushed downwards (upwards).  
 
If most individuals are capital constrained (most people supply labour), over half the 
population will be unable to become entrepreneurs and demand labour. There will therefore 
be a labour surplus in wage interval        and         that will push the equilibrium wage 
rate down to lower wage bound  . Thus a stable equilibrium at   is possible under 
assumption: 
   
   
  
0 1       
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 (4.25)  
 
Thus an economy of high income inequality will produce a low-wage equilibrium of  . 
 
Figure 4.5: Wage equilibrium in   
 
 
 
For an equilibrium in    to exist, demand needs to outstrip supply and push wages upwards 
in wage range        while supply needs to be larger than demand and push wages 
downwards in wage range        . I need to assume that capital constrained individuals 
make up fewer than half the population, which will cause a demand surplus and push the 
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wage to upper bound in       . I also need to assume that the Dalit population added to the 
capital constrained fraction of high castes count over half the population, which will cause a 
supply surplus in          and move the wage to the lower bound. I therefore need a dual 
assumption: 
 
         
       
     
 
 
 (4.26)  
 
 
          
     
 
 
 (4.27)  
 
Assumption (4.26) pushes the wage to upper bound in wage range        while (4.27) 
pushes it to the lower bound in        , thus creating an equilibrium in   . Thus an 
economy with many Dalits and low income inequality will be likely to produce an 
equilibrium of   . 
 
Figure 4.6: Wage equilibrium in    
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(4.17) shows that all Dalits want to be workers if the wage rises over   . An assumption of  
  
       
     
 
 
 is therefore not sufficient to get an equilibrium at the upper wage bound 
  . I also need to make an assumption on the size of the Dalit population. To ensure a 
demand surplus that pushes the wage upwards in both        and        , I need to assume 
that the Dalit population and capital constrained fraction of high castes together make up 
under half the total population:  
 
 
 
           
     
 
 
 (4.28)  
 
An economy with few Dalits and low income inequality will therefore be likely to produce an 
equilibrium wage of   . 
 
Figure 4.7:  Wage equilibrium in   : 
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The extended version of the model thus has possible wage equilibriums in  ,   , and   . In 
order to simulate a situation where parts of the population become trapped in low income, I 
make assumption (4.25) and obtain equilibrium wage  . An agent who is capital constrained 
can then choose between being a worker and engaging in subsistence, and in either case the 
income is  . Both Dalit and high-caste individuals who are non-constrained will want to 
become an entrepreneur and earn total income                   .  
4.4.4 Wealth transition 
With the knowledge of occupational income I write down the difference equations, describing 
the development of household  `s capital      from one generation to the next. A part   of the 
labour and capital income is left for the next generation of each household.   
 
If an agent is employed as a worker or in subsistence, the wealth transition from one 
household generation to the next will be equal to: 
 
 
If an agent is entrepreneur, the wealth transition will be equal to: 
 
 
Dalits have less profit as entrepreneurs and save the same fraction   as high caste households 
do. Dalit-entrepreneurs’ generational transfers are therefore lower than those of high castes.  
4.4.5 Long run equilibrium 
I now proceed to describe the long-run equilibrium of the economy where the wealth level is 
stationary over generations for all households. Let    be the stationary point of the difference 
equations that describe the wealth of a household in occupation   at wage level  . I insert the 
stationary points in the difference equations (4.29) and (4.30) and solve for    to find the long 
run wealth of each occupation. I first solve the equation for workers and households in 
subsistence: 
                   (4.29)  
           
                   (4.30)  
       
  
    
 (4.31)  
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All households that are initially capital constrained will converge towards    . The long-run 
wealth level for workers and household in subsistence is equal for Dalits and high castes. 
Long run wealth however differs between Dalit and high caste entrepreneurs since Dalits earn 
less income due to low social capital,      : 
 
 
Non-constrained Dalit households will in the long run converge towards wealth level   
  and 
non-constrained high caste households will converge towards   
 .  Dalit entrepreneurs thus 
have less wealth in the long-run equilibrium than high caste entrepreneurs,   
    
 . In Figure 
4.8 below we see the long-run wealth level of each occupation, which is determined along the 
45 degree line. 
 
Figure 4.8: Long run equilibrium   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
      
              
    
 (4.32)  
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If I define a household with wealth level     as poor, lack of social capital is able to induce a 
group-specific poverty trap.  If   
      
 , all Dalit households would in the long run 
become capital constrained and unable to invest in entrepreneurship, while non-constrained 
high castes would be entrepreneurs. Product market discrimination could therefore make it 
impossible to maintain entrepreneurship over generations. If the coefficient for the effect of 
low social capital   is sufficiently high, discrimination could also shift long-run Dalit 
entrepreneur wealth   
  below worker and subsistence wealth    . Dalit households would 
then prefer subsistence or being a worker as these occupations yield higher long-run wealth. 
 
Discrimination in the product market is however not likely to be the only economic 
disadvantage that Dalits face as a result of low social capital. As previously mentioned Dalits 
have traditionally held low-income occupations, and is currently the poorest group in Nepal 
(NLSS, 2012). In the model, this could translate into Dalits being more likely than other 
groups to be initially capital constrained and thus poverty trapped. Non-constrained Dalit 
households would due to low social capital also suffer reduced entrepreneur-wealth, 
potentially making investment in entrepreneurship impossible to maintain over generations, or 
unprofitable when compared to subsistence or being a worker.  
4.5 The entrepreneurs of Baijanathpur 
In this subchapter I compare the occupational structure of the model to anecdotal evidence 
from the qualitative interviews done during the fieldwork. Descriptive statistics showing the 
full occupational distribution of my sample divided by caste are displayed in chapter 5. 
 
So who are the entrepreneurs of Baijanathpur? The entrepreneurs of the model are self-
employed, earn more than other occupations and demand labour. Dalits as a group are poor 
and discriminated so I do not expect Dalit households to become entrepreneurs by investing in 
large businesses. During the fieldwork we encountered few Dalit entrepreneurs with 
businesses that surpassed self-employment. A large portion of the Dalit households 
interviewed however participated in the modern and urbanized economy of Biratnagar by 
working in the construction sector. The construction workers were split between unskilled 
workers and workers with vocational skills, of which most were masons. Are these skilled 
workers comparable to the entrepreneurs of the theoretical model?  
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The construction workers are self-employed and travel in groups to the urban labour market in 
Biratnagar where they rent out their labour to building contractors via short-term contracts. 
Those with specific vocational skills such as masonry were during interviews stated to be 
better paid than those unskilled.  It is however not obvious that the skilled workers themselves 
hire labour in the same manner as entrepreneurs in the model. On the other hand, skilled 
workers such as masons are needed for construction work projects.  Thus, the presence of 
skilled construction workers is necessary for there to be a labour demand for unskilled 
construction workers.  
 
Households in the model invest to become entrepreneurs. Is there an investment needed to 
become a skilled worker? According to Aboud, Barrett and Bezuneh (2001), endowments 
such as human capital are determinants of the choice of occupational strategy in rural Africa, 
including whether individuals gain income from skilled or unskilled work. Several 
respondents of our qualitative interviews named basic education as an important factor in 
deciding which workers acquire vocational skills. Masonry was for instance reported to 
require both reading and calculation. Educating children is a household investment in human 
capital which comes with opportunity costs as well as financial costs. It makes the household 
forego income which would be earned by putting children to work, and might require a 
financial resources that would earn interest if not invested (Barham et al., 1995). The 
investment in turn could yield a return of higher earnings. Educational investment is by no 
means trivial in the context of Baijanathpur: Tarai Dalits are at the bottom of educational 
indicators in Nepal (Das and Hatlebakk, 2009).  
 
Skilled workers thus seem to fit the description of entrepreneurs from the theoretical model. 
According to anecdotal evidence from the fieldwork they are self-employed, have higher 
income than unskilled workers and are required to undertake educational investment to 
become skilled. We were not provided indications that skilled construction workers like 
entrepreneurs hire other workers, but the presence of skilled workers in the construction 
sector is necessary for there to exist demand for unskilled work in construction.  
 
Another group which might resemble the entrepreneurs of the theoretical model and be skilled 
workers in terms of having high wages is factory workers. Eastern Tarai is as previously 
mentioned a manufacturing hub, and according to qualitative interviews Dalits are employed 
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in factories, frequently via short term contracts. Education was reported by respondents as 
being an advantage for gaining factory-employment.  
 
In the model, capital constrained individuals are either low-wage workers or self-employed in 
subsistence. These occupations resemble low-income occupations such as unskilled wage 
labour or rickshaw pulling, which are common occupations among the Dalits of Tarai.   
4.6 Research question and hypothesis 
Traditionally many Dalits have worked as unskilled wage labourers or rickshaw pullers. Some 
have however managed to take a step up the economic ladder by gaining employment as 
skilled wage labourers in the modern sector of the economy. I first formulate a research 
question  
 
What factors decide which Dalits escape poverty? 
 
I will attempt to answer the research question by testing whether the extended version of 
Ghatak and Jiang (2002) can be applied to the case of Dalits of Baijanathpur. It would thus be 
appropriate to formulate some hypothesises which are drawn from the theoretical model.  
 
I will test if skilled workers conform to the model predictions of entrepreneurs in the model, 
and if unskilled workers conform to the predictions of workers and subsistence. In the case of 
the Dalits of Baijanathpur, anecdotal evidence indicates that education is important to advance 
to skilled work. Investing in education could therefore be the entrepreneurial investment of 
skilled workers: Education increases the likelihood of skilled compared to unskilled work for 
Dalits. I will refer to this hypothesis as H1. To my knowledge, no such studies of transitions 
between skilled and unskilled work have been undertaken in the context the Dalit community 
of Nepal.  
 
In the model, Dalits could be caught in long run poverty due to low social capital. Dalit 
households should thus invest less in education over the generations than non-Dalit 
households: Dalit households are more likely than non-Dalit households to experience 
persistently low levels of education over generations.  I will refer to this hypothesis as H2. 
The results from the investigation of this hypothesis will be used to discuss whether the Dalits 
of Baijanathpur could be caught in a poverty trap. 
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4.7 Chapter summary 
Poverty traps in the literature assume many forms and occur for individuals, groups or even 
nations in both single- and multi-equilibrium environments. They can be caused and enforced 
by a highly diverse group of factors such as for example; health shocks, bad institutions, risk 
adversity and the limited growth-potential of small-business. The literature also provides a 
link between social identity and poverty traps. The model presented by Akerlof (1976) states 
that those disfavoured by the caste system through certain forms of discrimination can be 
trapped in poverty in a stable equilibrium. This is supported by the fact that Dalits are the 
poorest group in Nepal, a placement that mirrors their position at the bottom of the caste 
system. What I have learned about poverty traps will be used in chapter 8 to discuss whether 
or not there exists a poverty trap for the Dalits of Baijanathpur. 
 
I extend a model presented by Ghatak and Jiang (2002) to include social capital. The 
predictions of the theoretical model provide hypotheses to test in order to discuss poverty 
dynamics among the Dalits of Nepal. In chapter 6 I will construct an empirical specification 
which is a reduced and estimable form of the extended version of the theoretical model, 
before proceeding to in chapter 7 where I choose econometric the models that will be used to 
do the estimation. In chapter 8 I estimate the empirical model in order to test H1 and H2. 
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5 Data structure and descriptive analysis 
 
My aim in chapter 5 is to describe the structure of the survey-data through use of descriptive 
statistics. Female family members are omitted from the sample as there are very different 
processes that explain occupational outcomes among males and females in rural Nepal. I first 
show the caste distribution among the 110 households in the sample. Afterwards I split the 
sample into different occupational categories in order to compare the occupational distribution 
among different caste-groups, and examine what are the most important channels of economic 
mobility for the Dalits of Baijanathpur. The occupational structure in rural Tarai is far more 
varied than in the theoretical model, something that is reflected in the wide range of 
occupational categories.  
 
According to H1, individuals progress to skilled work via investing in education. In order to 
test this hypothesis I need to identify a general wage threshold between skilled and unskilled 
work. This is done by exploring the wage levels of construction workers with specific 
vocational skills. After displaying occupational distribution I discuss some possible issues of 
data validity in the sample. 
5.1 Caste distribution 
Over half of the households interviewed are Dalits. As we see in Table 6.1, the Dalits 
surveyed are split among the Bantar and Musahar, with a clear majority belonging to the 
Bantar group. The main explanation for the Bantar majority is the high concentration of 
Bantar households in Ward number 3 and 6 of Baijanathpur. All interviews done in these 
areas were exclusively conducted with Bantar households, while the Musahar households 
were spread out over number Ward 1, 7 and 9.   
 
The rest of the sample is split between middle castes of Tarai and Madhes origin. The Tharu 
and Rajbanshi are both indigenous ethnic groups of the eastern Tarai whom are considered to 
be middle castes. The Madhes middle castes descend from middle caste immigrants that the 
last few generations migrated to Tarai from India. They have a smaller presence in the 
sample, but are highly heterogeneous with a small number of families belonging to groups 
such as the goldsmith caste Sonar or barber caste Thakur. One household of the religious 
hermit caste Barathi Yogi have also been included in this Madhes middle caste category, as 
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they despite traditional religious functions are not considered to be among the high-caste 
Brahmins.  
 
The only surprise with the caste distribution is the lack of any Pahadi hill migrants in the 
sample. No hill migrants have thus settled on this land on the less developed outskirts of 
Biratnagar. As previously mentioned, considerable numbers of families and individuals 
stemming from Nepal’s hill areas have migrated to the plains of Tarai since the middle of the 
20
th
 century.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Occupational categories 
Agricultural wage labour is included in its own category as this is traditionally a common 
occupation among Dalits, which is low-wage and typically considered unskilled. Rickshaw 
pulling is a small-business occupation where we might expect poor and low-status groups to 
be over-represented, and is also listed in its own category.  
 
Table 5.1 – Households in sample by caste 
 
                     Caste 
 
                      Frequency 
Dalit 
Bantar 44 (40.0) 
 
Musahar 
 
17 (15.5) 
 
Non-Dalit 
Tharu 
 
Rajbanshi 
 
Madhes 
 
27 (24.5) 
 
14 (12.7) 
 
8 (7.3) 
 
Total 
 
 
110 (100.00) 
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I divide workers that are not engaged in the agricultural labour or rickshaw pulling into skilled 
and unskilled work along the lines of income. Income was during the interviews reported as 
either daily wage or monthly salary. Individuals working in the construction sector with 
specific vocational skills such as masonry or carpentry do not to earn daily wages of less than 
400 NR (Table A3, Appendix).
 
I therefore set 400 NR or more as the daily wage threshold 
that qualifies workers for being ranked as ‘Skilled worker’. In Table A4 of the Appendix we 
see that this wage is higher than the wage of any agricultural labourer, and higher than the 
daily income of the large majority of rickshaw pullers. Workers that earn less than 400 NR are 
categorized as ‘Unskilled worker’. I set a monthly wage divide between skilled and unskilled 
labour at 8000 NR in monthly wage, as this wage seems consistent with a daily wage-
threshold of 400 NR.
 3
  
 
I create an upper class category, ‘Office’, for high-salaried employees in the government and 
private sectors. It contains individuals that report monthly salary of 10 000 NR or more. 
Workers that obviously do not have an office job are excluded from the category, and so are 
workers that report daily wages instead of monthly salaries. ‘Office’ thus does not include 
factory workers, restaurant/hotel workers or construction sector workers, regardless of wage 
level.   
 
Ideally I would create several business-owner categories that were ranked after the size of the 
business, but the survey lacks sufficient information on revenue or turnover. The ‘Business’ 
category is therefore highly heterogeneous in terms of business-size. Over-seas work migrants 
are also listed in their own category, ‘Migrant’, as their salaries tend to be higher than that of 
any other groups even though their work tends to be similar to the work done by workers in 
the middle-income ‘Skilled wage’ category, rather than the high salaried employees of the 
‘Office’ category (Table A6, Appendix). Nepali migrants in India are excluded from the 
‘Migrant’ category, as their wage level is expected to be more similar to Nepali wage level. 
 
 
                                                 
3
 A daily wage thresehold of 400 NR and monthly wage threshold of 8000 NR also seems consistent with wage 
data across occupations: The mean wage for individuals that state their salary in terms of a daily wage is 374 NR 
while the median wage is 350 NR The median wage for workers that report their income in terms of monthly 
salary is 8000 NR and the mean is 8443.7 NR. The “Migrant” category is excluded from this calculation as these 
would distort the results due to their high wage levels. (Table A1, Appendix) 
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Table 5.2 – Sample population 
 
 
 
Dalit groups 
 
Non-Dalit groups 
 
 
Categories 
 
Bantar 
 
Musahar 
 
Tharu 
 
Rajbanshi 
 
Madhes 
 
Total 
 
Agri-labour 
 
15 
(10.5) 
 
17 
(27.4) 
 
1 
(1.1) 
 
3 
(5.6) 
 
0 
(0.0) 
 
36 
(9.4) 
 
Rickshaw 
 
26 
(18.2) 
 
9 
(14.5) 
 
0 
(0.0) 
 
0 
(0.0) 
 
2 
(6.3) 
 
37 
(9.7) 
 
Unskilled worker 
 
20 
(14.0) 
 
15 
(24.3) 
 
18 
(19.6) 
 
12 
(22.6) 
 
5 
(15.6) 
 
70 
(18.3) 
 
Farmer 
 
14 
(9.8) 
 
1 
(1.6) 
 
26 
(28.3) 
 
12 
(22.6) 
 
3 
(9.4) 
 
56 
(14.7) 
 
Business 
 
11 
(7.7) 
 
0 
(0.0) 
 
10 
(10.9) 
 
4 
(7.6) 
 
7 
(21.9) 
 
32 
(8.4) 
 
Skilled worker 
 
27 
(18.9) 
 
10 
(16.1) 
 
13 
(14.1) 
 
10 
(18.9) 
 
5 
(15.6) 
 
65 
(17.0) 
 
Office 
 
3 
(2.1) 
 
0 
(0.0) 
 
6 
(6.5) 
 
3 
(5.7) 
 
4 
(12.5) 
 
16 
(4.2) 
 
Migrant 
 
1 
(0.7) 
 
0 
(0.0) 
 
4 
(4.3) 
 
3 
(5.7) 
 
0 
(0.0) 
 
8 
(2.1) 
 
Inactive 
 
26 
(18.1) 
 
10 
(16.1) 
 
14 
(15.2) 
 
6 
(11.3) 
 
6 
(18.7) 
 
62 
(16.2) 
 
Total  
 
 
143 
(100.0) 
 
62 
(100.0) 
 
92 
(100.0) 
 
53 
(100.0) 
 
32 
(100.0) 
 
382 
(100.0) 
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5.3 The occupational distribution among different castes 
The Bantar are traditionally considered above the Musahar in the caste hierarchy even though 
both groups are Dalit. The extended version of the Ghatak and Jiang (2002) model, predicts 
that different levels of social capital, represented by different castes, could transfer into 
different occupational outcomes. I therefore expect the Musahar to be more concentrated in 
low-income groups than the Bantar, and that the Bantar in turn are more concentrated in low-
income occupations than the middle-caste Tharu, Rajbanshi and Madhes.  
 
As we see from Table 5.2, the Musahar of the sample are concentrated in a smaller set of 
occupations than the Bantar.  They are the best represented group in the agricultural labour 
category, and also well represented among rickshaw pullers. There are no Musahar present in  
the high-income ‘Migrant’ or ’Office’ category and none are business owners. The middle-
income ‘Skilled worker’ group seem to provide the Musahar with some upwards mobility, as 
this category is generally better paid than ‘Agricultural labour’, ‘Rickshaw’ and of course 
‘Unskilled worker’ (Table A4, Appendix).  The Bantar are in accordance with my 
expectations more concentrated in low-income occupations than the non-Dalit groups. Most 
Rickshaw-pullers are Bantar and the group is over-represented as agricultural workers 
compared to the non-Dalit groups. They nonetheless have a more varied occupational 
structure than the Musahar. There are a small number of Bantar present in the high income 
categories, ‘Migrant’ and ‘Office’. The Bantar are even the best represented caste in the 
middle-income ‘Skilled worker’ category. They are equally well-represented in the ‘Business’ 
category as the non-Dalit Rajbanshi group. 
 
There are very few non-Dalits working in low-income occupations such as agricultural labour 
or as rickshaw pullers. The non-Dalit groups are however not under-represented among other 
types of unskilled workers. Compared to the Dalit groups the other castes are over-
represented in the high-salary category ‘Office’ and the Tharu and Rajbanshi are over-
represented in the ‘Migrant’ category which is the best paid category of the sample (Table A2, 
Appendix).  
 
The Dalit groups are concentrated in the least attractive occupations and under-represented in 
the most attractive ones. Among the Dalits the Bantar do better than the Musahar. The non-
Dalits groups are compared to the Dalits over-represented in high-income occupational 
categories such as ‘Office’ or ‘Migrant’. 
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5.4 Who are the skilled workers? 
Using the wage level of construction workers with specific vocational skills, I formed a wage 
threshold between skilled and unskilled for workers in my sample. In Table A5 of the 
Appendix we see that 42 out of 65 skilled workers are employed in the construction sector. 
Dalits are to a greater extent employed in the construction sector than non-Dalits: Three out of 
four Dalit skilled workers are employed in construction, and only half of non-Dalit skilled 
workers. The second largest group in the skilled worker category is for both groups’ factory 
workers, while the rest are employed in private businesses or organizations.  
 
The large group of skilled construction and factory workers with a wage premium over low-
income occupations supports the anecdotal evidence from the qualitative interviews: Skilled 
work in the construction sector and factory employment are important means of economic 
mobility for Dalits. 
5.5 Data reliability 
Data reliability measures how trustworthy the data is (Grønmo, 2004), and our interview-
context might have induced biases for the respondents when reporting certain variables.  
Despite stating clearly and in advance of each interview that the survey is not a possible 
source of economic benefit for the respondent, the respondent could for instance feel 
incentivised to under-report their current economic status. We clarified during each 
fieldwork-interview that we were not from developmental organizations. The respondent 
might still expect that research results displaying adverse economic conditions will lead to 
longer term economic benefit. This income-reporting bias could be amplified by the 
attendance of a foreigner, me, which in the mind of the respondent could be linked to 
developmental motifs. The variable most liable to be affected by such a bias would be 
income. Despite this it is reassuring to see that the daily wages for low-income occupations 
are highly concentrated. For instance, the wage for workers in unskilled occupations like 
agricultural labour or rickshaw-pulling are concentrated in a small range (Table A4, 
Appendix).  
  
In the interviews we probed for information on individuals in the household head’s family. In 
some cases, the respondent might not be able to remember all family members. If the 
household head for instance is deceased, it is not sure that the respondents, his children or 
spouse, will remember all his brothers. In South Asia family sizes have decreased rapidly in 
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recent decades. In 2011 the average number of child births for a Nepali woman was 2.7. In 
1983, the earliest year of birth of any household head
4
, the average number of child births was 
however 5.7 (World Bank, 2013b). I would therefore expect considerably more brothers than 
household head.  There are few brothers in sample, only slightly more than there are 
household heads (Table A7, Appendix). There is thus likely to be some extent of under-
reporting. 
5.6 Chapter summary 
The occupational distribution of Baijanathpur seems to correspond to the predictions of the 
theoretical model. Dalit groups with a low placing in the caste hierarchy, which in the model 
translates into less social capital, are more probable to be found in less attractive occupations. 
This also holds true for comparisons between the two Dalit groups of the sample as the higher 
placed Bantar do better than the Musahar. 
 
The anecdotal evidence provided by the qualitative interviews is supported by the descriptive 
statistics of Table 5.2: The main pathway out of poverty for Dalits seems to be engaging in 
skilled work that has a wage premium over unskilled occupations. This occupational category 
is with few exceptions better paid than the low-income occupations where Dalits are over-
represented, such as agricultural labour and rickshaw pulling. Among the skilled workers, 
construction workers related to specific vocational skills are the largest group, followed by 
factory workers.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Household heads in my sample are at least 30 years of age. 
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6 Empirical model and variables 
 
In this chapter I present an empirical specification of the theoretical model which will be used 
to test the hypotheses that were put forward in chapter 4. Afterwards, I proceed to define the 
variables that will be used to estimate the empirical model in chapter 8.  
 
My sample would ideally accommodate the use of all occupations and castes from Table 5.2 
when testing test hypotheses H1 and H2. As the sample size is not large enough, I however 
merge some of the caste-groups and occupational categories.  
 
As shown in the previous chapter, the occupational structure of the sample is more complex 
than in the theoretical model. In my application of the model, human capital investment is 
predicted to determine whether workers become skilled or unskilled. Other factors might 
however decide whether individuals become workers in the first place. In particular, I suspect 
that ownership of agricultural land, a form of physical capital, could make individuals less 
prone to become workers as they can more easily engage in farming. In the empirical model, I 
therefore assume that present ownership of physical capital can have an effect on occupational 
outcomes.  
 
Another deviation from the theoretical model is the inclusion of a control variable for family 
size. According to surveys conducted in Nepal, poverty increases with household size and 
number of young children (NLSS, 2012). Being born in a large family could thus affect an 
individual’s probability of getting education.  
6.1 Empirical model 
In my application of the theoretical model, educational investment decides occupational 
outcomes. As land ownership is likely to affect occupational choice, I assume that physical 
capital can have a separate effect. Present occupation,  , is thus dependent on physical 
capital,   , as well as human capital,     
 
             (6.1)  
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Present human capital is in turn dependent on the physical and human capital of the previous 
generation. Furthermore, social capital affects whether one can afford or is willing to invest in 
human capital.  
 
                  (6.2)  
 
I treat caste as a fixed amount of social capital over generations. I therefore replace     with   
which stands for caste. Other factors which are not included in the theoretical model,  , could 
also affect human capital investment. 
 
                 (6.3)  
 
Human capital today is thus a function of physical and human capital in the last generation, as 
well as caste and other factors. In chapter 8 I proceed to estimate the empirical model. 
Equation (6.1), occupational outcomes, is estimated in order to test hypothesis H1.  Equation 
(6.3), human capital investment, is estimated in order to test H2.  
6.2 Variables 
6.2.1 Occupation 
In chapter 5 I observed that the occupational structure of rural Tarai is far more varied than in 
the theoretical model. The number of observations in my sample is however too small to test 
all occupational categories separately. I now proceed to define a smaller set of occupational 
categories that will allow me to test for differences among the occupational categories that are 
the most relevant to hypothesis H1: Skilled and unskilled work.  
 
The ‘Agricultural labour’ and ‘Rickshaw’ categories are largely populated with Dalits and 
often considered to be unskilled occupations. Both occupations have daily wages that with 
few exceptions fall below 400 NR, the threshold that divides unskilled and skilled labour 
(Table A4, Appendix). I include ‘Agricultural labour’, ‘Rickshaw pulling’ and ‘Unskilled 
wage’ in the ‘Unskilled’ category, signifying unskilled wage labour.  
 
Overseas migrants tend to be engaged in similar kinds of work as individuals in the ‘Skilled 
worker’ category (Table A6, Appendix).  I therefore merge ‘Skilled wage’ and ‘Migrant’ into 
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the ‘Skilled’ category, signifying skilled wage labour. One might argue that the work of 
individuals in the ‘Office’ category is also skilled, but their work tends to be very different in 
nature from those in the ‘Skilled wage’ or ‘Migrant’ categories. There are probably different 
mechanics that decide whether a Dalit becomes a government teacher, which would be 
included in the ‘Office’ category, than whether he becomes a carpenter, which would be 
included in the ‘Skilled worker’ category. I therefore exclude ‘Office’ from the ‘Skilled’ 
category.  
 
All occupations that are excerpt from the ‘Skilled’ and ‘Unskilled’ categories are included in 
the ‘Other’ category. ‘Other’ is thus highly heterogeneous in terms of both income and type of 
work. 
 
 
Table 6.1 – Occupational categories 
 
Occupation 
 
Occupational categories of Table 5.2 
 
Unskilled (1) 
 
Agri-labour, Rickshaw, Unskilled labour 
 
Skilled (2) 
 
Skilled labour, Migrant 
 
Other (3) 
 
 
Farmer, Inactive, Office, Business 
 
From table 6.1 I observe that occupation is a discrete variable, i.e. it can only take on a limited 
set of values. I assume that ‘Skilled’ because of the higher wage level is preferred over 
‘Unskilled’. It is however difficult to conclude on the direction of preference between these 
two categories and the ‘Other’ category, as it consists of a heterogeneous group of 
occupations. There is thus no clear ordering between the three categories. 
6.2.2 Physical capital – Landlessness 
In rural Nepal, land ownership is the most important form of physical capital ownership. Over 
70 percent of Nepali households own agricultural land (NLSS, 2012), and landless households 
in South Asia tend to be worse off than land owning ones (Mendelsohn and Vicziany, 1998).  
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In Table 6.2 I observe that the Dalits of my sample own land in a much smaller proportion 
than non-Dalits. The large majority of Dalit households are in fact landless. I therefore use 
landlessness as a proxy for ownership of physical capital. By using this binary proxy variable 
I assume that land owning households have higher levels of physical than landless ones. 
 
 
Table 6.2 – Landlessness among households 
 
   
Sub-sample Dalit 
 
Non-Dalit 
Land owner 8 (13.1) 27 (55.1) 
   
Landless 53 (86.9) 22 (44.9) 
   
Total 
 
61 (100.0) 49 (100.0) 
 
The survey provides information on the land ownership of three household generations. The 
land ownership of the current generation was measured at the time of the survey. Land 
ownership of the previous household generations was meanwhile measured at 40 years of the 
father and grandfather of the household head.  
 
When testing H1 by estimating (6.1), I estimate the relationship between present landlessness 
and occupational outcomes. I expect landlessness to decrease the chance of an individual 
ending up in ‘Other’ compared to ‘Skilled’ or ‘Unskilled’ because the category contains 
farmers, many of whom are directly dependent on land ownership.
5
 The expected direction of 
landlessness’ effect on whether a worker becomes ‘Skilled’ or ‘Unskilled’ is ambiguous as it 
depends on how land ownership was used to finance educational investment. Agricultural 
land can finance education both through being a productive asset and as an asset for sale. If 
land was sold off to finance educational investment, I could expect it to increase the 
                                                 
5
 Some farmers also rent land. 
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probability of an individual becoming ‘Skilled’. If agricultural produce was used to finance 
education without selling land, I might expect present landlessness to increase the chance of 
an individual becoming ‘Unskilled’. 
 
When testing H2 by estimating (6.3), I estimate the relationship between landlessness in the 
previous generation and illiteracy today. Households that owned land in the previous 
generation should other things being equal have been more able to invest in the education of 
the current generation.  I therefore expect landlessness of the previous generation to increase 
the chance of illiteracy in the current generation.   
 
Applying the last argument requires me to carefully evaluate when I measure land ownership. 
Land ownership in the previous household generation is measured at 40 years of age of the 
father of the household head. At that time the household has probably made a part or whole of 
its decision of whether or not to invest in the present household generation’s education. 
According to my argument, one way to finance education is to sell land. Thus landlessness at 
the father’s time could also mean that the household already sold off land to invest in the 
education of the next generation. Within the theoretical model we might picture that land 
ownership at this point in time is actually measured in the current generation, after investment 
in education. Land ownership at 40 years of the grandfather’s age is however more likely to 
be measured after the household made a decision on whether or not to invest in the education 
of the father’s generation, but before it decides whether to invest in educating the previous 
generation. I therefore use land ownership at the grandfather’s time when estimating the effect 
of the previous generation’s landlessness upon illiteracy today. 
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6.2.3 Human capital – Illiteracy 
The sample contains information on the education of three household generations: The 
education of current household members as well as for the household head’s father and 
grandfather.  Most Dalits in the sample have no education:  In Table 6.3, we see that four out 
of five Musahar and three out of five Bantar lack any schooling. I therefore choose illiteracy, 
meaning lack of education, as the proxy for human capital. By using this binary proxy, I 
assume that illiterates have lower levels of human capital than individuals with education.  
 
When testing H1 I estimate the relationship between illiteracy and occupation. H1 predicts 
that skilled workers are more likely to be educated than unskilled workers. I therefore expect 
illiteracy to decrease the chances of an individual becoming a ‘Skilled’ worker compared to 
‘Unskilled’. As the ‘Other’ category includes high-salaried private and government 
employees that depend on education, I expect illiteracy to make an individual more likely to 
become ‘Unskilled’ when compared to the ‘Other’. Both ‘Skilled’ and ‘Other’ include 
occupations which are likely to require education. I therefore do not have any clear prediction 
of the direction of the effect when comparing the effect of illiteracy on these occupational 
categories. 
 
When testing H2 I estimate the relationship between illiteracy over different generations. The 
model predicts that lack of education decreases income and thus the amount of capital 
available to invest in the education of the next generation. I therefore expect illiteracy in the 
previous generation to increase the chance of illiteracy in the present generation for both 
castes.  
 
According to H2, Dalits should due to low social capital however be more likely to experience 
persistently low levels of education than non-Dalits. I therefore expect the illiteracy of the 
previous generation to predict illiteracy in this generation more strongly for Dalits than non-
Dalits. 
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6.2.4 Caste 
Due to a small sample size I need a smaller number of subsamples than displayed in Table 5.2 
to estimate the empirical model. This in turn requires me to merge some of the castes. I 
include both the Musahar and the Bantar in a Dalit subsample. The rest of the castes are 
merged into a non-Dalit subsample.  
 
Table 6.3 – Individual education sorted by castes 
 
Category 
 
Musahar 
 
Bantar 
 
Non-Dalits 
 
Total 
 
Illiterate 
 
 
49 
(79.0) 
 
83 
(58.0) 
 
34 
(19.2) 
 
166 
(43.4) 
 
Grade 1 
 
8 
(12.9) 
 
25 
(17.5) 
 
28 
(15.8) 
 
61 
(16.0) 
 
Grade 5 
 
4 
(6.5) 
 
28 
(19.6) 
 
49 
(27.7) 
 
81 
(21.2) 
 
Grade 9 
 
1 
(1.6) 
 
3 
(2.1) 
 
28 
(15.8) 
 
32 
(8.4) 
 
SLC 
 
0 
(0.0) 
 
1 
(0.7) 
 
27 
(15.3) 
 
28 
(7.3) 
 
Intermediate 
 
0 
(0.0) 
 
3 
(2.1) 
 
11 
(6.2) 
 
14 
(3.7) 
 
Higher level 
 
0 
(0.0) 
 
0 
(0.0) 
 
0 
(0.0) 
 
0 
(0.0) 
 
Total 
 
 
62 
(100.0) 
 
143 
(100.0) 
 
177 
(100.0) 
 
382 
(100.0) 
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Hypothesis H1 rests on qualitative information on the economic status of the Dalit 
community: Transitions between skilled and unskilled work as a main channel of economic 
mobility. This anecdotal evidence is further backed by the descriptive evidence of table 5.2. 
Transitions between skilled and unskilled work does however not seem to be a central feature 
of economic mobility among non-Dalit groups. They are better represented in high income 
occupational categories such as office work and migration as well as farming and business. 
Furthermore, they are almost absent in low income unskilled occupations such as agricultural 
wage labour and rickshaw pulling. Equation (6.1) is therefore estimated only for the Dalit 
subsample.  
 
Hypothesis H2 states that Dalits due to poverty and low levels of social capital should suffer 
persistently lower levels of education than other groups. In order to compare, I estimate 
equation (6.3) separately for the Dalit and non-Dalit subsamples.  
6.2.5 Family size 
When testing H2, there might be factors outside the theoretical model that affect educational 
investment. A variable that is not included in the model, but likely to affect educational 
investment is family size. I therefore create a dummy variable for being born into a large 
family. In 1983, the earliest year of birth of any household head, the average number of child 
births was 5.7 (World Bank, 2013b). I set the threshold for belonging to a large family to 
having more than two brothers.  
 
Sons born in large families might be less likely to get education, as more sons could increase 
competition for scarce resources. However, more sons could also increase the income of the 
household if they are put to work. It is therefore hard to predict what direction the effect of 
family size could have upon educational investment.  
6.3 Chapter summary 
The empirical specification of the theoretical model will be used to test the hypotheses put 
forward in chapter 4. The empirical model however deviates from the theoretical model in 
two important manners: Present physical capital is predicted to have an effect separate from 
human capital on occupational outcomes, and family size could affect educational investment. 
I choose landlessness as a proxy variable for physical capital and illiteracy as a proxy variable 
for human capital. 
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7 Econometric methodology 
 
In this chapter, I aim to present the econometric models which will be used to estimate the 
empirical model. As pointed out, the estimation needs to handle different types of discrete 
dependent variables: Illiteracy and occupation. I therefore present three econometric models 
that will be used to do the estimation. The choice of models is based on a discussion of 
econometrics literature and investigation of my data. 
 
The Ordinary Least Squares model (OLS) is one of the most important methods in 
econometrics and estimates parameters in a linear regression model. I therefore start this 
chapter by outlining the OLS model and its assumptions, as this has important implications 
for the discussion on which models to report. Using OLS when estimating binary outcomes, 
such as illiteracy, can be problematic as some of the classic assumptions are violated. It is on 
the other hand not obvious that other econometric model will do better (Angrist and Pischke, 
2009). When handling the binary dependent variable of equation (6.3), illiteracy, it is 
therefore useful to report both a logit model of binary choice and OLS estimates. When 
estimating the occupational outcomes of equation (6.1), I choose a multinomial logit model. It 
is a generalized version of the logit model of binary choice and has certain desirable 
properties which will be outlined in the coming sections. For all models I describe underlying 
assumptions and interpretation of the coefficients. The presentations are based on Wooldridge 
(2009) and Greene (2012). 
7.1 The ordinary least squares method of estimation 
The multiple linear regression model states that a variable, y, changes when other variables, 
          , changes. The problem can mathematically be written as 
 
                                     
 
where    shows the relationship between    and  .    define the marginal effect; how the 
dependent variable, y, changes when the independent variable, x, changes one unit. 
Correspondingly,         are the coefficients for the respective marginal effect of         
on  .    is a constant and does not depend on the value of the independent variables.   is the 
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error term and includes all omitted variables that affect y, i.e, all other variables than 
          . 
 
Before calculating the OLS estimators, the assumptions of the model should be presented. The 
OLS method rests on the Classical Linear Model (CLM) set of assumptions. The descriptions 
are quoted from Wooldrige (2009). 
OLS Assumption 1, Linearity in Parameters: 
The model in the population can be written as                      where    
            are unknown parameters of interest and   is an unobservable error or 
disturbance term. 
OLS Assumption 2, Random sampling: 
We have a random sample of   observations,                        , following the 
population model in Assumption 1. 
OLS Assumption 3, No Perfect Collinearity: 
In the sample (and therefore in the population), none of the independent variables are 
constant, and there are no exact linear relationships among the independent variables. 
OLS Assumption 4, Zero Conditional Mean: 
The error   has an expected value of zero given any values of the independent variables. In 
other words,               . 
OLS Assumption 5, Homoskedasticity: 
The error   has the same variance given any values of the explanatory variables. In other 
words,                 
 . 
OLS Assumption 6, Normality: 
The population error   is independent of the explanatory variables         and is normally 
distributed with zero mean and variance                  . 
 
   is an unbiased estimator of population parameter   if        . Under OLS Assumption 1 
to 4 the OLS estimators are unbiased estimators of population parameters. If we add OLS 
Assumption 5 to the first four, the OLS estimator becomes the ‘best linear unbiased estimator’ 
(BLUE). This means that it is the estimator with lowest possible variance. Thus when OLS 
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Assumption 1 through 5 are fulfilled, the OLS estimator has the lowest variance of all 
unbiased estimators. OLS Assumption 6 is needed for statistical inference. This assumption 
leads to the   and   distributions, and thus the ability to draw sound statistical conclusions. 
If Assumption 5 is violated the OLS estimator will lose the property of being the estimator 
with the smallest possible variance. If Assumption 4 is violated the estimators will become 
unbiased.  
7.1.1 The OLS-estimator 
The estimates of the OLS-model are calculated by minimizing the sum of squared residuals.  
For simplicity, I use a simple linear model with only one variable    affecting    
 
               (7.1)  
 
I solve for    and obtain 
 
               (7.2)  
 
According to OLS Assumption 4 the expected value of the    is zero and the covariance 
between    and    is expected are zero 
 
        (7.3)  
 
                  (7.4)  
 
I substitute with the expression from (7.2) and (7.4) to get get  
 
               (7.5)  
 
                  (7.6)  
 
Because the true values of the parameters     and    are unknown, these are substituted with 
    and     which estimate the parameter-values, which indicates that the coefficients are 
estimates of the true parameter-values. A sample of the population has a selection of   
respondents. The population parameters are estimated according to:  
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   (7.7)  
 
 
  
 
                  
 
   
   (7.8)  
 
I have an expression for estimator     in equation (7.8). I rearrange and define means 
 
 
    
 
 
   
 
   
    
 
 
   
 
   
        (7.9)  
 
I substitute (7.9) into (7.8) and rearrange 
 
  
 
                      
 
   
   (7.10)  
 
 
  
 
        
 
   
 
 
 
            
 
   
 (7.11)  
 
As long as        
  
     , equation (7.11) can be written as 
 
 
             
 
   
                 
 
   
 (7.12)  
 
I solve for     obtain and obtain the estimator 
 
 
    
             
 
   
        
 
   
 (7.13)  
 
Coefficients produced by the OLS method estimate marginal effects, i.e. the change in the 
dependent variable that follows from a one unit change in the independent variable, if all 
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other independent variables are fixed. The calculations of this sub-chapter are from 
Wooldridge (2009). After presenting the classical assumptions of the OLS model, I will now 
argue whether or not it is suitable to handle binary variables. 
7.2 Binary dependent variable 
The dependent variable in equation (6.3) of my empirical model, illiteracy, is a binary 
variable, i.e. it only takes two values. If a multiple linear regression uses a binary dependent 
variable, the model is called a linear probability model (LPM), which is a special case of the 
OLS method. The main advantage of using LPM is that the coefficients are easy to interpret. 
If both dependent and independent variable are dummy variables, such as in my analysis, 
coefficients equal the change in the mean value of the dependent variable when the 
independent variable is changed from 0 to 1, at given levels for the other variables. The 
coefficient can therefore be interpreted as the difference in probability of illiteracy among 
different groups of the sample. The intercept equals the mean value of the dependent variable 
when all independent variables are set to 0.  
 
Though it gives rise to easily interpretable coefficients, the LPM model has some important 
limitations. First, estimated probabilities can become negative or larger than one. 
Furthermore, while the assumption of normally distributed error terms is straightforward if the 
dependent variable is continuous and can take on all values, this is not the case for variables 
with only two outcomes, like illiteracy. Binary variables are not normally distributed and 
neither are the error terms,   , as they can only take on a limited number of values. Moreover, 
because the error term is limited, it will not be constant or independent of explanatory 
variables,   . This violates the assumption homoscedasticity. When applying OLS to binary 
dependent variables, Assumption 5 and 6 are thus violated. The estimator is still unbiased, but 
no longer BLUE. This makes statistical inference from the regression results less exact.  
 
Opinions differ on whether linear regressions should be used when estimating binary 
variables. Some econometric textbooks claim that OLS is not suitable for handling binary 
dependent variables and opt for the use of other techniques such as the logit or probit models 
(Greene, 2012, p. 727). The logit and probit model of binary choice addresses the problems of 
linear estimation of limited dependent variables, and are commonly applied. They provide 
estimated probabilities between 0 and 1, and tend to yield very similar results.  
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Angrist and Pischke (2009) however argue that the OLS method functions just as well. 
According to Wooldridge (2009), the usual OLS statistics are not far off when dealing with a 
binary dependent variable and therefore acceptable to use.  The logit model also poses 
specific issues to this estimation, i.e. through being unable to estimate coefficients in cases of 
separation. This issue is further detailed in the coming sections. 
 
I conclude that whether OLS or other models of binary choice are the best alternative when 
dealing with binary dependent variables is still an ongoing discussion in the literature. I 
therefore present both OLS and logit model results when estimating equation (6.3). Due to 
issues of separation, as well as easiness of interpretation, I will rest my main analysis on the 
OLS estimates. I do on the other hand compare the OLS coefficients to the approximations of 
the logit model as a check of statistical inference. In the next sections I will therefore outline 
the logit model of binary choice, before proceeding to discuss the case of limited dependent 
variables with more than two choices. 
7.2.1 The logit model of binary choice 
Binary dependent variables do not violate the assumptions of the logit model as it does not 
assume normality, linearity, or homoscedasticity. The logit model of binary choice describes 
the probability that     , conditional on a vector of independent variables,   . It assumes a 
standard logistic distribution of the dependent variable. The model is specified by 
 
 
                 
          
            
   (7.14)  
 
which is estimated by using the maximum likelihood method. A central transformation of 
     , the logit transformation, takes the shape 
  
        
     
       
         
(7.15)  
 
     is commonly called the log-odds and share some of the properties of the linear 
regression model: It is continuous, linear in parameters and able to take values from    to ∞.  
The estimated coefficients,   , are mostly made use of to estimate the sign or significance of 
effects. They are interpreted as the change in the log-odds that is produced by a one-unit 
increase in the independent variable. If the independent variable is a dummy variable it 
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measures the change in the log-odds that is produced if the dummy variable equals one 
compared to if it equals zero. To interpret the size of the effects, we study the marginal 
change in probability. It is defined by the partial derivative of        with respects to    
 
  
      
   
 
           
                
   
 
(7.16)  
 
One technique is to obtain the marginal effect of    for an average observation in the sample 
by fixing all other independent variables at their average. This approach does however not 
make sense when dealing with binary independent variables, as the average person might be 
for instance have a value of for instance 0.5illiteracy and 0.3landlessness. I therefore use an 
alternative technique: For each observation we plug in the two possible values of   , and the 
actual values of the other variables. Then we calculate the average value of the difference in 
obtained probabilities over the whole sample. Results using the logit model to estimate 
equation (6.3) are presented in chapter 8, and are calculated by using the logit procedure in 
STATA.  
 
Like the OLS model, the logit model assumes collinearity to be relatively low. This can be 
problematic when estimating heavily correlated variables. 
7.2.2 Separation 
The logit model suffers certain numerical issues. If an independent variable separates the 
outcome groups completely, estimates of the logit do not exist (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000, 
p.136). The issue of complete separation occurs when estimating the relationship of illiteracy 
over generations for the Dalit sub-sample of equation (6.3). In Table 7.1 I observe that literate 
Dalit fathers of household heads do not have any illiterate sons.  
 
Standard logit estimation will therefore not able to estimate coefficients of the correlation of 
illiteracy over generations in the case of Dalits, and STATA will not provide any output. For 
comparison, I will however present the logit model estimates for the non-Dalit sub-sample. 
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7.2.3 Interaction terms 
H2 predicts that Dalits should experience more persistent illiteracy over generations than non-
Dalits. After estimating equation (6.3), I therefore need to test whether generational illiteracy 
between the Dalit and non-Dalit sub-samples is significantly different. Dummy variables for 
different groups can be interacted to test for slope differences. The model I run is the 
following: 
 
                            (7.17)  
 
where   is the Dalit group-dummy which is set to one for Dalits and zero for non-Dalits,    is 
father’s illiteracy and    represents illiteracy. If     , Dalits and non-Dalits share the same 
coefficient for   . If     , Dalits and non-Dalits do not share the same coefficient.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.1 – Illiteracy over generations 
  
Dalits 
 
Non-Dalits 
 
 
 
Literate father 
 
Illiterate father 
 
Literate father 
 
Illiterate father 
 
Literate son 
 
7 (100.0) 
 
16 (14.0) 
 
14 (93.3) 
 
 55 (70.5) 
 
Iliterate son 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
98 (86.0) 
 
1 (6.7) 
 
23 (29.5) 
 
Total 
 
7 (100.0) 
 
 
114 (100.0) 
 
15 (100.0) 
 
78 (100.0) 
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7.3 Categorical dependent variables 
The dependent variable of equation (6.1) of the empirical model is occupation. The dependent 
variable is in this case not binary, but indicates whether one of three possible occupational 
choices has occurred. There is no intrinsic ordering between the different categories: ‘Skilled’ 
is expected to be preferred over ‘Unskilled’, but there is no predicted preference between 
these categories and the ‘Other’ category. Occupation is thus a categorical variable, i.e. a 
variable with two or more categories, but with no clear ordering.  As previously explained, 
OLS is not necessarily the best estimation method in cases of limited dependent variables as 
Assumption 5 and 6 are not fulfilled when the dependent variable can only take on a limited 
set of values. 
 
As in the case if binary outcomes, the logit and probit model addresses these issues. When 
estimating categorical outcomes these models are referred to as the multinomial logit and 
probit model. The multinomial logit model is the most commonly applied as it has certain 
desirable properties: The probability of choosing among any binary set of categories, for 
instance ‘Skilled’ and ‘Unskilled’, is assumed to be independent from the addition or 
subtraction of any other alternative.
 
This assumption is called the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA) and greatly simplifies model estimation, but as we shall see, it can at times 
be a stringent assumption of behaviour. The multinomial probit model or other alternatives to 
the multinomial logit model are usually considered if the IIA assumption is violated (Greene 
2012, p.810). After outlining the multinomial logit model, I will therefore discuss whether my 
estimation of equation (6.1) violates the IIA assumption.  
7.3.1 The multinomial logit model 
The multinomial logit model is a generalization of the logit model of binary choice. Suppose 
that a dependent variable consists of several unordered categories,                   , with 
corresponding probabilities,                    .     equals the probability of outcome    ,  
    equals the probability of outcome    , and so on.  
 
The standard way of relating     to independent variables when using a multinomial logit 
model, is estimate a set of     log-odds, and set the coefficients of one base category to 
zero. We set outcome   as a baseline category. The coefficient is then calculated from the log-
odds of probability     to probability    ,  
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                 (7.18)  
 
Coefficient    is interpreted as the as the change in the log-odds of choosing category   versus 
category   that is produced by a one-unit increase in the independent variable. If the 
independent variable is a dummy,    measures the change in the log-odds of choosing 
category   versus category   that is produced if the dummy variable equals one compared to if 
it equals zero. Notice that the log-odds do not depend on any of the other categories of the 
dependent variable than those directly compared. This property of the logit model is the IIA 
assumption, and simplifies the estimation the coefficients. This follows from an assumption of 
the independence of the disturbance of error variables. If odds ratios are not independent from 
the alternatives, the parameter estimates will become inconsistent (Greene, 2012, p. 804). 
 
As with the case of the binary choice model, I can compute the marginal effects. They allow 
me to interpret the size of the probability change of ending up in one of each of the 
occupational categories. As the marginal effects do not depend on comparison with a base 
category, we obtain marginal effects for all categories.  
7.3.2 The IIA assumption 
When estimating model coefficients, it is useful that the log-odds do not depend on the other 
alternatives of the dependent variable. The IIA assumption might however be a problematic 
restriction on individual behaviour. The gravity of this issue depends on nature of the choices. 
For example the probability of driving your Ford car relatively to using your bicycle would 
probably change if you also bought a Mustang car. In the most troublesome cases, dependent 
variable categories thus serve as substitutes for others. Therefore it has been argued that the 
multinomial logit model works best if the independent variables are dissimilar and not just 
substitutes for each other.  
 
Estimations of occupational choice are less disposed to such issues (Borooah, 2002, p. 73). A 
relevant case for the Dalits of Baijanathpur would be to consider if the probability of choosing 
masonry compared agricultural wage labour would change if becoming a teacher is added as 
an occupational alternative. There does not seem to be any obvious reasons why the addition 
of another alternative should alter the choice between masonry and agriculture labour. As the 
‘Skilled’ occupations are generally better paid, I expect them to be preferred over ‘Unskilled’ 
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occupations no matter what other categories are included (Table A4, Appendix). I therefore 
conclude that the IIA-assumption does not seem to pose trouble for the estimation of equation 
(6.1).  Results using the multinomial logit model are presented in chapter 8 and are calculated 
by using the mlogit procedure in STATA. 
7.3.3 Occupational outcomes and causality 
It is difficult to draw firm conclusions of causality when modelling occupational outcomes. 
Very many factors affect an individual’s occupational choice and some of them are likely to 
be unobservable or not included because of limited data. Omission of such variables will lead 
to biased estimates if they are correlated with any of the independent variables of the 
estimated model.  
 
I cannot exclude the possibility that any relationship between education and occupation is 
spurious, caused by an unobserved variable which is correlated with both. In my case, a 
variable such as individual ability is hard to measure, but might be correlated with illiteracy, 
which in my model means lack of education. Dalits that advance to ‘Skilled’ labour could do 
so because they have greater individual ability, which again could be correlated to illiteracy. 
The descriptive evidence in Table 6.3 however shows that four out of five of the Musahar and 
three out of five Bantar in the sample lack any formal education, a much higher rate than for 
non-Dalit groups. The higher illiteracy rates imply that many Dalits do not invest in 
education, no matter ability level. Thus I do not expect illiteracy to be highly correlated with 
individual ability. The argument is further supported by anecdotal evidence from the 
qualitative interviews, which stated literacy and calculation skills as important to become a 
skilled worker in the construction sector. 
 
Furthermore, the relationship between contemporary endowments and occupational choice is 
simultaneous (Dolton, Makepeace and Van Der Klaaw, 1989, p. 573). Occupation could be 
affected by education, but occupational outcomes could also affect the accumulation of 
education. There could also be varying degrees of simultaneity for different capital stocks: 
The effect of occupational choice upon illiteracy could be different than its effect on 
landlessness. However, most educated Dalits only have low levels of education, which is 
usually completed at young age. It therefore seems unlikely that many Dalits take education 
after their occupational choice.  
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7.4 Clustering standard errors 
When estimating the empirical model, landlessness is measured at the household level. 
Because these observations are identical for individuals that belong to the same family, their 
standard errors will be correlated. If this correlation is not taken into account, the number of 
independent observation will be exaggerated, and the estimated standard errors will become 
too small. The underestimation of standard errors will in turn make statistical inference from 
regressions less exact. I therefore cluster standard errors to households.  
 
An added advantage of clustering standard errors to household is the large number of 
households in the sample. Clustering standard errors are only justified when the number of 
clusters becomes large, as small numbers of clusters can cause issues with statistical inference 
(Rogers, 1993). 
7.5 Chapter summary 
The OLS model is not necessarily the best option when estimating limited dependent 
variables. I therefore report logit model approximations in addition to OLS estimates when 
handling illiteracy as a dependent variable. Due to desirable properties deriving from the IIA-
assumption, I opt for the multinomial logit model when estimating occupational choice. 
 
I now proceed to present the regression results from the estimation of the empirical model. 
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8 Regression results 
 
In this chapter, I present regression results based on the empirical model. The analysis is 
centred on explaining occupational outcomes and present illiteracy, following two hypotheses 
that were formulated on the basis of theory and anecdotal evidence from the fieldwork. All 
calculations are obtained from STATA. 
 
I start out by investigating H1, which states that skilled workers are more likely to be 
educated than unskilled workers. The hypothesis is tested by estimating the occupational 
choice of equation (6.1) for the Dalit subsample. Observations consist of the individuals for 
whom I have information on present education and land ownership; household heads as well 
as their sons and brothers that are currently in the household.
 
 
 
H2 states that Dalits invest less in education over the generations than non-Dalits. In order to 
investigate this hypothesis I first estimate the correlation of illiteracy over two household 
generations for both subsamples. I then proceed to estimate equation (6.3) by including 
variables for family size and grandfather’s landlessness.  
 
As shown in table 7.1, the logit model suffers issues of separation when estimating the effect 
of father’s illiteracy for the Dalit subsample. I therefore report logit model estimates only for 
the non-Dalit subsample, while the OLS estimates are presented for both. The main analysis is 
done with the OLS estimates, which are compared to the logit approximations as a check of 
statistical inference and direction of effects. 
 72 
 
                                                 
6
Includes household heads as well as brothers and sons that are currently in the household 
 
8.1 Regression tables 
 
Table 8.1 – Results from the multinomial logit model with 
occupation as dependent variable 
 
 Dalit sub-sample 
 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) 
Occupation Unskilled Skilled Other 
Coefficients  
 
Illiterate 
  
 
-2.185*** 
 
 
-0.948** 
  (0.613) (0.391) 
Landless  0.863 -1.245* 
  (1.382) (0.659) 
Constant  -0.550 1.675*** 
  (1.318) (0.630) 
    
Pseudo R-squared 0.0973 
    
Marginal effects 
 
Illiterate 
 
 
0.275*** 
 
 
-0.224*** 
 
 
-0.0505 
 (0.0588) (0.0666) (0.0805) 
Landless 0.136 0.210 -0.346*** 
 (0.164) (0.156) (0.0920) 
    
Observations
6
 122 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors clustered on family 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Standard errors clustered on family 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                 
7
Includes household heads and their brothers 
 
 
Table 8.2 – Results from the OLS and binary logit model with present illiteracy as 
dependent variable 
 
 
 Non-Dalit sub-sample Dalit sub-sample 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Linear probability model 
 
   
 
 
Illiterate father 0.228** 0.244** 0.860*** 0.844*** 
 (0.0888) (0.101) (0.0414) (0.0991) 
Landless grandfather  0.0533  0.0767 
  (0.147)  (0.110) 
Large family  -0.199*  0.136* 
  (0.106)  (0.0697) 
Constant 0.0667 0.0667 -0*** -0.0778 
 (0.0643) (0.0650) (0) (0.0581) 
     
R-squared 
 
0.037 0.058 0.262 0.290 
Logit model: 
Coefficients 
    
     
Illiterate father 1.767* 1.841*   
 (1.064) (1.073)   
Landless grandfather  0.239   
  (0.688)   
Large family  -1.281   
  (1.098)   
Constant -2.639** -2.639**   
 (1.035) (1.035)   
     
R-squared 
 
0.043 0.059   
Marginal effects     
     
Illiterate father 0.326* 0.332*   
 (0.191) (0.188)   
Landless grandfather  0.0431   
  (0.124)   
Large family  -0.231   
  (0.195)   
     
Observations
7
 
 
93 121 
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8.2 H1 – Endowments and occupation  
As stated in subsection 7.3.1, the coefficients of the multinomial logit model are commonly 
used to interpret the direction and significance of effects. To interpret the size I rather study 
the marginal effects, which yield percentage probability interpretations. 
 
According to H1, education increases the likelihood of skilled work. The coefficient of 
illiteracy estimates that illiteracy makes it significantly less likely for Dalit individuals to 
become ‘Skilled’ when compared to ‘Unskilled’. The marginal effects meanwhile indicate 
that illiteracy makes it significantly 27.5 percent more likely for Dalits to become ‘Unskilled’, 
and 22.4 percent less likely to become ‘Skilled’.  
 
My data thus lends support to hypothesis H1: Unskilled workers are more probable to be 
illiterate than skilled workers. This finding backs up a notion that skilled workers resemble 
the entrepreneurs of the theoretical model in the sense that an investment in education is 
necessary to become skilled. As I observed in chapter 5, the large majority of Dalit skilled 
workers are construction workers, often related to specific vocational skills. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that investing in basic education is an advantage when learning such skills, 
as they might require calculation or reading. Education was also reported as being an 
advantage to become a factory worker, the second largest group among skilled workers (Table 
A5, Appendix). Such investment does in turn not seem to be required for Dalits that enter 
unskilled occupations, which can be seen as the equivalent of workers or subsistence in the 
theoretical model. On the other hand, I cannot completely exclude the possibility that the 
effect is spurious, i.e. that illiteracy is correlated to an unobserved variable which decides 
occupational outcomes. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the marginal effects indicate that present landlessness decreases the 
probability of ending up in the ‘Other’ category significantly by 34.6 percent. This result was 
expected as the ‘Other’ category contains farmers. The directions of landlessness’ marginal 
effects on becoming ‘Skilled’ or ‘Unskilled’ are both positive, but not significant.  
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8.3 H2 – Illiteracy over generations  
According to H2, Dalits should invest less in education over the generations than non-Dalits. 
To discuss this hypothesis, I start out with a bivariate analysis of the effect of father’s 
illiteracy on present illiteracy. I then proceed to include variables for family size and 
grandfather’s landlessness in a multiple regression. 
8.3.1 Father’s illiteracy 
The coefficients of the OLS model equal the change in the mean value of illiteracy when the 
binary independent variable is set from 0 to 1. As present illiteracy is a binary dependent 
variable, the coefficient can be interpreted as the difference in illiteracy rates among different 
groups in the sample. The intercept is equal to the mean value of the dependent variable when 
independent variables are set to 0.  
 
The intercepts of the bivariate regression are thus equal to the proportion of illiterates with 
literate fathers. For non-Dalits this share is 6.67 percent. The coefficient of father’s illiteracy 
tells us that the illiteracy-rate increases significantly by 22.8 percent for non-Dalits with 
illiterate fathers. For the Dalit subsample, the intercept is 0 as literate Dalit fathers have no 
illiterate sons. The probability of illiteracy increases significantly by 86 percent with father’s 
illiteracy, i.e. the share of illiterates among Dalits with illiterate fathers. As the coefficients 
differ significantly at the 1 percent level (Table B1, Appendix), I conclude that father’s 
illiteracy has a stronger effect on present illiteracy for Dalits than non-Dalits. I also observe 
that illiteracy is more persistent in Dalit than non-Dalit households. This result supports H2, 
and is a main finding of this thesis.  
 
As I learned from the intercepts, Dalit literacy is persistent as well: Literate Dalit fathers have 
no illiterate sons. In comparison, 6.67 percent of non-Dalit sons of literate fathers are 
themselves illiterate. There is however only seven such Dalit observations (Table 7.1), so I do 
not conclude that this result is a strong indication of a general trend in the Dalit population.  
 
Furthermore, father’s illiteracy explains a much greater share of the variance in present 
illiteracy for the Dalit subsample. The R-squared tells me that 26.2 percent of the variation in 
illiteracy is explained in the Dalit sub-sample, while merely 3.7 percent of the variation is 
explained in the non-Dalit data.  
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The theoretical model predicts that Dalits due to low social capital could become trapped in 
poverty. So does my data indicate the presence of a Dalit poverty trap? To discuss this, I 
would like to draw on the intuitions of the poverty trap in figure 4.1. This multi-equilibrium 
trap has one high wealth equilibrium and one low wealth equilibrium. Without the poverty 
trap, households would simply converge towards the high wealth equilibrium, as shown in 
figure 4.2, each generation doing better than the next.  
 
The binary measure of human capital assets in my analysis (literacy and illiteracy) could serve 
as a proxy of the high and low equilibrium wealth levels of the figure. If Dalit households are 
more concentrated than other groups at the low asset level (illiteracy) over several 
generations, this would indicate the presence of a poverty trap. Non-Dalits should on the other 
hand converge towards the high asset equilibrium (literacy), independently of the asset levels 
of the previous generation.  
 
As I have seen, illiteracy in the previous generation is far more correlated with present 
illiteracy for the Dalit households of my data. Dalit households are thus more likely to be 
stuck at low levels of human capital over two generations than non-Dalit households. 
Furthermore, the large difference in goodness of fit indicates that the education of the 
previous generation explains more of present education for Dalits than non-Dalits. I conclude 
that my findings could be interpreted as an indication of a poverty trap in the Dalit 
community. 
 
This test however says nothing about what mechanisms could enforce persistent Dalit 
illiteracy. Before discussing this, I want to investigate the robustness of my results. I therefore 
proceed to include variables for grandfather’s landlessness and family size in a multiple 
regression
8
, before comparing the OLS estimates to logit model approximations. 
8.3.2 Grandfather’s landlessness and family size  
The new estimation display the same main finding as the bivariate regression: Dalit 
households suffer more persistent illiteracy than non-Dalit households. The estimated effect 
of father’s illiteracy change only slightly to 84.4 percent for Dalits and 24.4 percent for non-
Dalits. Both variables retain their significance and remain significantly different (Table B1, 
Appendix).  
                                                 
8
 I.e. estimate the full equation (6.3) of the empirical model 
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The estimated effect of previous household landlessness are in line with expectations, as 
grandfather’s  landlessness is estimated to increase the likelihood of present illiteracy by 5.33 
percent for the Dalits and 7.67 percent for the non-Dalits. Land ownership could finance 
educational investment both through being a productive asset and as an asset for sale. The 
coefficients are however not significant and large standard errors make it difficult to conclude 
that this is the true direction of effect.  
 
The family size coefficients leave us with a somewhat unclear picture as family size is 
estimated to have opposite effects for Dalits and non-Dalits. Having a large family
9
 is 
estimated to increase the probability of Dalit illiteracy by 19.9 percent, but to decrease the 
probability of illiteracy among non-Dalits by 13.6 percent. These effects are, however, not 
very precisely estimated as they are only significant at the 10 percent level. The explanation 
might lie in the economic status of the Dalit community. Wealthy non-Dalit families could 
choose to get more children than poor non-Dalit families because they can afford to invest 
money in more children. Such an effect might not be strongly present among Dalits because 
few households are wealthy enough to invest in the education of more than two sons. The 
birth of another son into a most Dalit families would rather increase competition for scarce 
financial resources available for human capital investment, and thus increase the probability 
of illiteracy.  
 
Including more variables reveals a shortcoming of the OLS model when dealing with binary 
outcomes: The intercept of the Dalit subsample is negative. The predicted probability of 
illiteracy among observations with 0-values for all independent variables, i.e. Dalits with 
small families and land owning as well as literate fathers, is in other words negative. Negative 
probabilities of illiteracy are of course impossible. Fortunately, this estimate is not of great 
consequence to the discussion surrounding hypothesis H2 and poverty traps.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 More than two brothers 
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8.3.3 The logit model of binary choice 
The coefficients of the logit model retain the same directions as the OLS estimates. Father’s 
illiteracy is estimated to significantly increase the probability of illiteracy among non-Dalits. 
The effect is however less precisely estimated than its OLS counterpart, as it is significant 
only at the 10 percent level. The coefficient of family size has the same direction, but loses its 
significance.  
 
The size of the marginal effects can be directly compared to the OLS estimates. Father’s 
illiteracy is in the multiple regression estimated increase the likelihood of present illiteracy by 
33.2 percent, approximately 9 percent more than the OLS estimate. The size of the marginal 
effects of landlessness and family size are at 4.3 and -23.1 percent more similar to their 
corresponding OLS coefficients.  
 
I conclude that the approximations of the logit model seem fairly consistent with the OLS 
estimates: All estimated effects retain their directions, and father’s illiteracy remains 
significant, if only weakly so.  
8.3.4 Why do Dalits suffer more persistent illiteracy? 
Higher correlation of illiteracy over the generations for Dalit households conforms to the 
prediction of hypothesis H2. The test does however not provide any indication of what kind 
of discrimination is causing persistent Dalit illiteracy. A quantitative investigation is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, but a discussion of theory and actual circumstances will hopefully 
provide some insight.  
 
I first return to the framework of the extended Ghatak and Jiang (2002) model. In my 
application of the model, groups who start out poorer are more likely to become capital 
constrained and less likely to invest in education. In other words, Dalit households with 
illiterate fathers could simply have been poorer than comparable non-Dalit households at the 
time of educational investment, and therefore less able to afford it.
10
 
 
                                                 
10
 Greater poverty could besides scarcity of financial capital also have other adverse effects on educational 
investment. As discussed in chapter 2, poverty could induce a high marginal utility of present consumption. 
Higher utility of consumption could again increase the opportunity cost of educational investment. Lower levels 
of other forms of human capital, such as poor health/nutrition, could also follow from greater poverty, and 
possibly reduce the learning capacity of Dalit children at school. 
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There are several reasons to suspect that discrimination of Dalits could have induced greater 
poverty. For starters, Dalits have traditionally been excluded from segments of the labour 
market. Many Dalits of eastern Tarai have been engaged in feudal principal-agent relations 
with landlords as low-paid agricultural labourers. Some of these contracts have been 
contingent on restriction of other labour contracts, or the landlords could have colluded with 
other potential employers in order to restrict outside options. Discrimination of Dalits in the 
labour market might also have taken other forms: Dalits earn lower wages than higher castes 
both in the non-agricultural and agricultural sector (Das and Hatlebakk, 2009). Anticipation of 
continued labour market discrimination could also have made Dalit households choose to 
invest less in education because they anticipated smaller returns in terms of higher income 
than other castes.  
 
Hatlebakk (2009) furthermore finds caste-based price discrimination in informal rural credit 
markets. As Dalits are at the bottom of the caste system, they could be liable to suffer such 
discrimination. Higher interest rates or demands for collateral might thus have hindered Dalit 
households from performing profitable investments or from financing education with 
borrowed capital. As illustrated by the theoretical model, discrimination in the product market 
could also have hindered Dalits from engaging in entrepreneurship. In subchapter 4.3.4, I 
summarized two studies that found positive correlations between entrepreneur income and 
measures of social capital. 
 
Moreover, Tarai Dalits have historically been subject to judicial discrimination: Individuals of 
the Musahar caste have been denied Nepali citizenship, which is a legal requirement for land 
ownership. Land ownership could in turn have helped finance educational investment through 
land sale or agricultural produce. In my data, I found a positive, yet not significant effect, of 
previous household landlessness on present illiteracy. 
 
Discrimination within the schooling system could be another explaining factor. One 
respondent of the qualitative interviews stated that Musahar children were discriminated by 
being denied handouts of school material offered to children of higher castes. Dalit 
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households could thus be required to compensate their lack of social capital by substituting 
with more financial capital.
11
 
 
To sum up, Dalits could in the previous generation have suffered greater poverty than non-
Dalits due to several kinds of market-discrimination, and therefore have been less able or 
willing to finance the education of their sons. Anticipation of more discrimination in the 
future could also have contributed to the persistence of illiteracy by further reducing the 
willingness to spend resources on education.  
8.4 Summary of findings 
In the analysis, illiteracy is found to be strongly correlated with poor occupational 
performance. Illiterate Dalits are significantly more likely to end up in poor unskilled 
occupations than in better paid skilled occupations. My data thus supports hypothesis H1, 
which states that education should increase the likelihood of skilled compared to unskilled 
work for Dalits. 
 
Even so, I cannot exclude the possibility that the effect is spurious, i.e. that illiteracy is 
correlated to an unobserved variable which in turn decides occupational outcomes. Anecdotal 
evidence on the largest groups of skilled workers, construction workers with vocational skills 
and factory employees, however suggest that education is an advantage for advancing from 
unskilled to skilled work. 
 
H2 states that Dalit households should invest less in education over generations than other 
groups. Illiteracy is in my data found to be more correlated over generations for Dalits than 
non-Dalits, a result that supports the hypothesis. On the other hand, literacy is also found to be 
persistent among the few Dalit individuals with literate fathers.  
 
The strong generational persistence of Dalit illiteracy could be interpreted as evidence to 
support a notion that the Dalit community are suffering a poverty trap induced by low social 
capital. This test does however not provide any indication of what types of discrimination 
could have caused stronger correlation in Dalit illiteracy.  
                                                 
11
 Such discrimination could be represented in the theoretical model by raising the Dalit investment cost of 
education to   , thereby making Dalit households more probable to become capital constrained. Dalit households 
in wealth interval          would, as opposed to non-Dalit households, be unable to invest in education. 
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A discussion of theory and actual circumstances suggest that Dalit households in the previous 
generation could have suffered greater poverty due to several forms of market-discrimination, 
and therefore have been less able or willing to finance education than households of higher 
castes. Anticipation of future discrimination could also have contributed to the persistence of 
illiteracy by reducing the willingness of Dalit households to perform educational investment. 
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9 Discussion and policy analysis 
 
The literature suggests that links between social identity and economic outcomes can induce 
greater poverty among groups with low social status. This seems to hold true in Nepal where 
Dalits, the group at the bottom of the caste system, is also the group with the highest poverty 
rates. The aim of my thesis has been to investigate what factors make some Dalit households 
escape poverty and others stay behind.  
 
A main finding is that illiteracy is more likely to persist over generations for Dalits than non-
Dalits. In turn, present illiteracy is strongly correlated with poor occupational performance 
among Dalits. Anecdotal evidence furthermore indicates that education is an advantage to 
advance from unskilled to skilled labour, which seems to be the main channel of economic 
mobility for the Dalits of my data. The persistence of low levels of education could therefore 
have induced greater poverty among Dalits today.  
 
Increasing the Dalit participation rate in basic education could thus be an efficient means of 
alleviating poverty. This could be done through demand side incentives such as subsidizing 
the costs of basic schooling or through launching information campaigns on the advantages of 
enrolling children in school. The large majority of Dalit skilled workers are furthermore 
employed in the construction sectors, frequently with vocational skills such as masonry or 
carpentry. Teaching vocational skills for which there is sufficient demand could therefore 
empower more Dalit households to climb out of poverty. 
 
More research is needed to decide exactly how discrimination enforces persistent Dalit 
illiteracy. Knowledge of local conditions may however provide some pinpoints. Providing 
citizenship to the Musahar Dalits, and thus the possibility of owning land, might be a means 
of improving their educational status, as land ownership could empower Musahar households 
to invest in the education of their children.  This argument might also provide a rationale for 
redistributing land-reform, as the majority of Tarai Dalits are landless (Das and Hatlebakk, 
2009).  
 
Further economic growth in Nepal and eastern Tarai could also improve on the economic and 
educational status of Dalit households. Growth could first and foremost spur more demand for 
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both skilled and unskilled workers in the modern sector of the economy, and possibly put 
upwards pressure on their wage levels. A general increase in demand of unskilled labour 
might in turn have spill-over effects into the agricultural economy. As mentioned, many Tarai 
Dalits have traditionally been engaged in different forms of feudal principal-agent relations 
with landlords as low-income agricultural wage labourers. More demand for unskilled labour 
in the modern sector could improve on the bargaining position of the Dalits who are still 
working in agricultural labour by strengthening their outside options, both in terms of wage 
and variety.  
 
The thesis has investigated determinants of Dalit poverty, but an important factor has not been 
commented upon: The willingness of local and national authority to commit to poverty 
alleviation among Dalits of Tarai. This together with knowledge of the economic and cultural 
context of eastern Tarai is crucial if one is to successfully reduce poverty among Dalits. 
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10 Appendix 
10.1 Tables 
 
 
 
Table A1 – Median and mean daily and monthly wage 
 
Category 
 
Daily wage (NR) 
 
Monthly wage (NR) 
 
Mean 
 
373.6 
 
8443.7 
 
Median 
 
350.0 
 
8000.0 
 
 
Table A2 –Monthly wage in sample 
 
Monthly wage 
(NR) 
 
Unskilled 
worker 
 
Skilled worker 
 
Office 
 
Migrant 
     
Under 8000 25 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
 
8000-11999 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
13 (86.7) 
 
6 (40.0) 
 
1 (12.5) 
 
12000-15999 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
1 (6.7) 
 
6 (40.0) 
 
1 (12.5) 
 
16000-19999 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
1 (6.7) 
 
3 (20.0) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
20000-23999 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
3 (37.5) 
 
24000-28000 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
3 (37.5) 
 
Total 
 
 
25 (100.0) 
 
15 (100.0) 
 
15 (100.0) 
 
8 (100.0) 
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12
 I suspect that individuals over 400 NR daily wage in the ‘No description’ category have vocational skills, as  
the vocational skills of construction workers were not recorded at the start of the fieldwork.  
 
Table A3 –Vocational skills and daily wage among construction workers 
 
Daily wage 
(NR) 
 
No description
12
 
 
Marble worker 
 
Mason 
 
Carpenter 
 
Total 
 
200-299 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
0 (0.00) 
 
300-399 
 
23 (74.2) 
 
2 (28.6) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
25 (37.9) 
 
400-499 
 
4 (12.9) 
 
5 (71.4) 
 
7 (36.8) 
 
2 (22.2) 
 
18 (27.3) 
 
500 or more 
 
4 (12.9) 
 
(0.0) 
 
12 (63.2) 
 
7 (77.8) 
 
23 (34.8) 
 
Total 
 
 
31 (100.0) 
 
7 (100.0) 
 
19 (100.0) 
 
9 (100.0) 
 
66 (100.0) 
 
Table A4 – Daily wage in sample  
 
Daily wage (NR) 
 
Agricultural labour 
 
Rickshaw  
 
 
Unskilled wage 
 
Skilled wage 
 
Total 
200-299 7 (22.6) 0 (0.0) 5 (12.2) 0 (0.0) 12 (8.8) 
 
300-399 
 
24 (77.4) 
 
15 (88.2) 
 
36 (87.8) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
75 (54.8) 
 
400-499 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
2 (11.8) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
23 (47.9) 
 
25 (18.2) 
 
500 or more 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
25 (52.1) 
 
25 (18.2) 
 
Total 
 
 
31 (100.0) 
 
17 (100.0) 
 
41 (100.0) 
 
48 (100.0) 
 
137 (100.0) 
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13
 Farming cooperative. 
 
Table A5 – Work among Dalits and non-Dalits in the ‘Skilled work’ category 
 
Occupation 
 
Skilled worker  
Dalit 
 
Skilled worker  
Non-Dalit 
 
Factory 
 
5 (13.5) 
 
8 (28.6) 
 
Construction 
 
28 (75.7) 
 
14 (50.0) 
 
Wage labour other 
 
1 (2.7) 
 
1 (3.6) 
 
Employee, 
restaurant/hotel 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
Employee, shop 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
Employee, private office 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
3 (10.7) 
 
Employee, private other 
 
2 (5.4) 
 
2 (7.1) 
 
Employee, government 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
Other 
 
1 (2.7)
13
 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
Total 
 
 
37 (100.0) 
 
28 (100.0) 
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Table A6 – Work descriptions among individuals in ‘Skilled work’, ‘Migrant’ and ‘Office’ 
 
Occupation 
 
Skilled worker 
 
Migrant 
 
Office 
 
Factory 
 
13 (20.0) 
 
3 (37.5) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
Construction 
 
42 (64.6) 
 
1 (12.5) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
Wage labour other 
 
2 (3.1) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
Employee, 
restaurant/hotel 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
1 (12.5) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
Employee, shop 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
1 (12.5) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
Employee, private office 
 
3 (4.6) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
Employee, private other 
 
4 (6.2) 
 
2 (25.0) 
 
4 (25.0) 
 
Employee, government 
 
0 (0.00) 
 
0 (0.00) 
 
10 (62.50) 
 
Other 
 
1 (1.5) 
 
0 (0.0) 
 
2 (12.50) 
 
Total 
 
 
65 (100.0) 
 
8 (100.0) 
 
16 (100.0) 
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10.2 Regression 
 
Table B1 –Results from OLS estimation and interaction effect 
with present illiteracy as dependent variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Standard errors clustered on family 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table A7 – Household heads and brothers 
 
Categories 
 
Household heads 
 
Brothers 
 
Total 
 
Total  
 
 
100 (48.1) 
 
108 (51.9) 
 
208 (100.00) 
 
 
(1) (2) 
Dependent variable Illiteracy Illiteracy 
   
Illiterate father 0.228** 0.212** 
 (0.0885) (0.0906) 
Landless grandfather  0.0760 
  (0.0900) 
Big family  0.0517 
  (0.0693) 
Dalit -0.0667 -0.0962 
 (0.0641) (0.0756) 
Dalit*Illiterate father 0.631*** 0.606*** 
 (0.103) (0.120) 
Constant 0.0667 0.0667 
 (0.0641) (0.0644) 
   
Observations 214 214 
R-squared 0.411 0.415 
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